So, while the RS-28 probably does represent an improvement to an existing Russian missile, it still replaces a comparable system. And that means the RS-28 isn’t a change in Russian nuclear posture, it’s a continuation. Russia has long placed a substantial fraction of its warheads on so-called heavy ICBMs. The RS-28 indicates that we shouldn’t expect that to change.
The love of heavy ICBMs is a Russian thing. Heavy ICBMs, particularly liquid-fueled ones like the RS-28, have advantages and disadvantages. Such a missile might be able to carry a large number of nuclear warheads, but it must be based in an underground silo. That makes all those warheads sitting in one spot an attractive target.
Liquid fuel, too, is not easy to handle. And keeping the missiles on constant alert can be tricky, something that Bill Clinton learned when he was governor of Arkansas.
There is no support in the United States Air Force for revisiting liquid-fueled missiles.
The Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, however, feel differently. To them, heavy ICBMs are Viagra mixed with vodka. The Russians want to keep a lot of nuclear warheads, and its gets very expensive building a missile for each and every warhead. Even when Russia was flush with oil revenue, there wasn’t enough money to fully replace Soviet systems. As a result, the Russians have built a smaller number of modern missiles and packed them with as many warheads as possible. The United States has taken the opposite approach — spreading warheads across a much larger number of missiles on land and at sea.
Most American analysts, including myself, think the Russians are crazy for putting so many eggs, so to speak, in so few baskets. It’s highly destabilizing, too. Consider the problem at hand: If one missile can destroy 10 targets, the Russians have an incentive to use nuclear weapons first. And if the U.S. president can protect those 10 targets by blowing up just one missile, then it gives Washington a further incentive to use nuclear weapons first. Multiple warheads favor the side that shoots first, which is the very definition of instability. That’s the view in the United States at least. In Moscow, I would probably be laughed out of the room as the kind of guy who has a tiny … dog.
So while the RS-28 is not, in itself, a dramatic change in the threat to the United States, it does represent a very dangerous Russian habit. It would be better if we could persuade the Russians not to do this.