Lots to go through here, @
Slant. I'll try to be brief without skipping too much.
I think they knew much more about it, prior to lending, than you're giving them credit for ("credit"? Get it? Haha...). GDP figures are generally a matter of public record, as are general tax and spend plans and how they pertain to debt and a national deficit. We weren't part of the negotiations, so can only speculate, but I'd be absolutely amazed if the state of the Greek economy was somehow alien to any member of the Troika.
Ireland was a somewhat unique case, but Portugal and the southern Eurozone is economically quite different to the northern. The reason for these countries to be in the European Union is obvious, but the single-currency? It's harder to convince me. Portugal, Spain, Greece and Italy are more economically alike when compared to France, Germany or the United Kingdom. Balkan states, such as Hungary, Croatia or the Czech Republic, haven't adopted the Euro for largely this reason; it doesn't necessarily make sense for them to do so.
As a result, the lending from the Troika that was accompanied by the demand for a southern economy to behave as if it were northern was, in some respects, an act of national vandalism. The fact that we know austerity is a disastrous economic policy under
any circumstances makes inflicting it on Greece even worse.
Note: I'm not saying that money should have been handed to the Greek government and no more said about it. That's deeply irresponsible. I'm simply saying that there should have been a far more holistic approach to the problem than what actually happened.
I'm sorry, but this is Brexit-style talk and it's just not true. Germany benefits
hugely from its part in the Eurozone, which is why it's so heavily invested in making sure it keeps working. I'm not one of the people who thinks Germany is a free-rider, far from it, but ignoring just what the EU does for the German economy is doing everyone a horrid disservice.
German exports get through the EU quickly and easily thanks to the freedom of goods, people and services; this export boom would have seen a rise in the Mark, something that obviously didn't happen with the common currency. Imagine what'd happen to the cost of German exports were there 15 currencies to trade in, rather than just one. It's funny that the nations who've struggled (Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Spain) were the nations that opened their borders to a competitive environment that their economies weren't built for, and didn't have their own currency with which to combat this problem.
You might argue that's why they were given cash to cushion the blow, but this didn't see the reforms that one might have hoped for. The nations we're talking about invested the cash wastefully (typically via cheap credit) and didn't have independent regulatory bodies to stop this corruption from happening, particularly in their banks that unsurprisingly went on to fail. It's perhaps no coincidence that more prudent nations, like the Balkan states I mentioned earlier, have maintained their own currencies and seem to be generally disinterested in signing up to the ERM-2.
They're acutely aware of what happens when divergent economies of vastly differing size try to compete.
It's a poker game where Germany has 1,000 chips, and their competitors have 10. It's, in essence, neoliberalism in its most basic form - those at the top can make error after error and recover, while those at the bottom are one bad hand away from disaster.
Those articles are horribly wrong, and are trying to disguise reality.
Look at it like this; most every country in the world runs a deficit, developed or not. The whole world is in debt. If it were a question of simply "paying taxes", that wouldn't be the case and the tax take would exceed public spending. In the UK, for example, the deficit is still around double what it was prior to the recession in 2008 (£20b to £40b) despite the better part of a decade under austerity.