Findings
Unless both U.S. and Chinese political leaders decline to authorize
their militaries to carry out their counterforce strategies, the ability of
either state to control the ensuing conflict would be greatly impaired.
Both would suffer large military losses from the outset and throughout
a severe conflict: In 2015, U.S. losses could be a relatively small fraction
of forces committed, but still significant; Chinese losses could be
much heavier than U.S. losses and a substantial fraction of forces committed.
This gap in losses will shrink as Chinese A2AD improves: By
2025, U.S. losses could range from significant to heavy; Chinese losses,
while still very heavy, could be somewhat less than in 2015, owing to
increased degradation of U.S. strike capabilities. A severe and lengthy
conflict would leave both with substantially reduced total military
capacity and thus vulnerable to other threats.
China’s A2AD will make it increasingly difficult for the United
States to gain military-operational dominance and victory, even in a
long war. However, provided the United States is nonetheless willing to
fight, China cannot expect to win militarily. Thus, the two could face
the prospect of an extremely costly military standoff.
This outcome implies that a conflict could be decided by domestic
political, international, and, especially, economic factors, all of which
would favor the United States in a long, severe war:
• Although a war would harm both economies, damage to China’s
would be far worse (perhaps 25–35* percent of GDP after
one year). Because much of the Western Pacific would become a
war zone, China’s trade with the region and the rest of the world
would decline substantially. China’s loss of seaborne energy supplies
would be especially damaging. Although consumption is a
smaller share of the Chinese economy than the U.S. economy, it
is expected to grow, leaving the Chinese economy vulnerable to
further contraction in the event of war.
• Politically, a long conflict, especially if militarily severe and economically
punishing, could expose China to internal division—
taxing and testing the state.
• The entry of Japan and, to a lesser extent, other U.S. partners in
the region could have a considerable influence on military operations.
The responses of Russia, India, and NATO are less important.
However, NATO efforts to preserve security in other regions
(at least Europe, if not also the Middle East) would permit greater,
or less risky, commitment of U.S. forces to war with China. Such
a combination of international responses could increase Chinese
losses in a long, severe conflict, despite improved A2AD.
In a nutshell, despite military trends that favor it, China could not
win, and might lose, a severe war with the United States in 2025, especially
if prolonged. Moreover, the economic costs and political dangers
of such a war could imperil China’s stability, end its development, and
undermine the legitimacy of the state.
Yet in the event of war, the military capabilities, motivations, and
plans of both sides make a severe, prolonged, and exceedingly costly
conflict a distinct possibility. Of the many reasons the United States
should not want such a war, the most important are the immense military
losses and economic costs to itself and the implications, for the
country, the region, and the world, of devastating harm to China.
Such prospects underscore the importance of both the United States
and China contemplating how to control and restrict fighting should a
crisis turn violent, which shines the spotlight on principles and procedures
for political control and communication.