2013-05-01 18:05
About the author
Bruce Acker is a former defense attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm.
WHY SWEDEN WOULD FIT IN AS A NATO MEMBER
In the midst of the tempest over the recent debate of Swedens Defense, Supreme Commander, General Sverker Göranson correctly noted that he was revealing nothing that professional observers couldn’t see clearly for themselves. None the less, the tempest continued and naturally broadened to include aspects of NATO defense and membership. Sometimes seeing clearly requires not only a professional eye, but a bit of professional distance from the issue. The debate also, yet again, pointed out the lack of a realistic NATO debate here in Sweden, and what little debate there is to date suffers from a lack of professional distance. This article seeks to examine some of the common Sweden-related NATO questions and hypothesis from an outsider’s perspective, admittedly, heavily influenced by an American view. My comments should not be considered answers to the posed questions but rather stimulus for further study and perhaps the long overdue debate on NATO membership. It is important to point out however that the following observations reflect personal observations, and in no way seek to represent either NATO or the US Government.
Will NATO assist Sweden in the event of an attack? At Sälen, NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen answered this question as clearly as a politician at his level likely ever will. Article 5 applies to NATO members and only to NATO members, not partners. But the right question is just as important as the answer. Let’s be clear, the foundation for Sweden’s unilateral solidarity declaration is completely correct. There exists no remotely conceivable scenario of an attack on Sweden where NATO’s vital interests are not threatened, likely at an unacceptable level to the alliance. If the question were, will NATO react militarily if Russia, for example, seizes key nodes in Swedish territory like Gothenburg harbour, or Gotland, the answer is most likely yes, with all haste. While NATO is not obliged to aid, Sweden and NATO’s interest coincide to a great degree—though defending the rear of the NATO-member Baltic States and the flanks of member Scandinavian nations are the decisive factors for NATO, not defending Swedish territory. The main point, however, remains: Without membership, Swedish interests are supported by coincidental NATO interests.
If unable to defend herself, why would NATO want Sweden as a member? This is the premise of the oft-quoted net contributor or net consumer argument, which with any limited analysis defies logic. Modern mobility makes most individual small nations indefensible without outrageous defense expenditures, and such outrageous expenditures are threatening in and of themselves. None of the NATO members, with the possible exception of a few, can realistically defend themselves, nor would they need an alliance if they could. The main point of NATO from the beginning was to provide for collective defense. Mr. Rasmussen answered this question as well, stating that were Sweden to seek membership, she would be welcome.
Does Sweden’s Armed forces have the capability to receive help. This is an interesting concept, founded in a military logistics planner’s competence in the complexity of reception, staging, and onward movement. Unfortunately, this thesis also falls victim to the logical flaw of overestimating enemy capabilities while underestimating one’s own. Here is the conundrum. A hypothetical enemy force lands in one or more places in Sweden, presumably in a contested entry, for the assumed purpose of exploiting key transportation notes and strategically advantageous positions. It is assumed that this will succeed not only without the assistance of Sweden, but in fact while exposed to all the resistance Sweden can assemble. By this argument, NATO on the other hand apparently needs a well-prepared Swedish reception in order to succeed. Compared to any foreseeable enemy to Sweden, NATO and the US have far greater experience assembling an effective fighting force in the most barren of environments. Arriving uncontested in the midst of one of the most developed infrastructures on earth would be simple compared to the places they have been in the past decades. The reality of course is that NATO would much prefer to be well received upon arrival, with a well-rehearsed plan to execute, but it is not a necessary condition. The purveyors of this theory are completely correct in one decisive aspect, at least from a Swedish perspective: Without the capability to receive and host assisting forces, command of the situation, and with it sovereignty, is significantly diminished.
Does NATO have the resources to defend Sweden? Of course this question is unanswerable without first identifying against what and with how much warning; and this is often taken out of context as was the Supreme Commander’s statement mentioned at the start of this article. Certainly NATO does not have the capacity in current combat readiness to repel an initial and then sustained attack wherever, whenever. Obviously the forces have reduced over the recent years, and there is no rebuilding on the horizon commensurate with the stated Russian re-armament plan. These kinds of questions though often overlook a critical element of planning, and that is assessing the enemy’s strategic objectives. One likely strategic objective from Sweden’s perspective is to defend all of its territory. As long as Sweden is not a member, NATO will not likely place that objective in the strategic category, but as an operational or tactical objective. It seems unlikely an enemy in the foreseeable future will have a strategic objective to take Swedish territory, but rather will see that as a means to some other end. Most discussions within the limited Swedish debate argue that a likely end will probably be either securing a platform for action in the Baltics or, as some claim, to secure economic lines of communication. I rather strongly dispute the latter in the context of a NATO debate as it implies a split in NATO, since those economic lines go to NATO-member Germany among others. So from a NATO perspective, what is needed is sufficient capacity to prevent the enemy from achieving its strategic objectives, that is using Swedish territory for its advantage. This will require a sizable capability, but does not necessarily require immediately ejecting soldiers from Sweden. Any ground forces occupying Sweden would likely not directly threaten the Baltics, rather it is the air and sea power they support that are the threat. It is also important to note that without Swedish assistance, any invading enemy will have vulnerable logistics paths to defend. Commanding or disputing the air over and the seas around Sweden would probably suffice and it is likely possible for NATO to rapidly deploy that capability. What this scenario implies then is an enemy ground force present in Sweden, removal of which will be much higher on Sweden’s list of objectives than it will be on NATO’s, though it is likely both will desire to see the occupation end eventually.
What can Sweden offer that NATO wants? In this regard, it perhaps is not nearly as bleak as one might think from what appears in some media. By and large, when Sweden contributes something, it is well-equipped, well trained, compatible and complete. The Swedish Air Force, for example, is at the head of the class in the region, and amongst the best of the world. Don’t be confused by the occasional pessimistic review. NATO recognizes from Swedish participation in the Lybia operation and a variety of comprehensive exercises that the airplanes, crews and logistics capabilities integrate into modern warfare essentially seamlessly. There is little doubt that the Swedish-led EU Nordic battle group, both in 2008 and 2011, met expectations at least as well, if not better than any other EU battle group since the idea was conceived. When Sweden deploys soldiers, they are high-end, mature soldiers, well suited to mentoring and assisting organic fighting forces. Sweden has invested in strategic and tactical mobility in their airlift and medium lift helicopter programs. Abroad, the Swedish Navy has proven it has the ships, leadership and crew to participate and lead international flotillas. In the event of a Baltic crisis, Sweden possesses superb underwater capability, not to mention its proven skills to attack and sink US aircraft carriers, undetected, in the Pacific. Most importantly, Sweden possesses geography and arguably a unique appreciation of its geography. Nearly all arguments of a military threat to Sweden start with geography.
Will Sweden save money on defense by joining NATO? As stated earlier, the force necessary to defend a small nation alone is outrageously large and therefore expensive. Cooperation yields economic as well as operational efficiencies. However, motivating a NATO membership campaign on the basis of cost savings alone risks NATO’s welcoming attitude toward Swedish membership. Arguments about the affordability of defense in NATO are not well received, especially in the US, and within Europe surely few are willing to subsidize Sweden’s defense, as the Swedish economy is perceived as being well above the norm within NATO. In a brief moment of political clarity, the departing US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made this abundantly clear in his farewell address to a NATO audience.
A healthy NATO debate would address these questions thoroughly and certainly uncover many more. Although Sweden’s choices appear rather limited indeed and fairly well known, it is the analysis of the outcome of the various paths that must be explored to make a rational decision. From my vantage point, most common arguments made to date lack depth, credibility, and analysis.