The US defense secretary, Ash Carter, has accused Russia of endangering world order

[Fyersing]

The phrase "endangering world order" is just sensationalism; we (that is, America) may be one of the only countries truly capable of providing a means of maintaining Western Civilization, but we're certainly not the country that is the best representation of it.

An enormous percentage of the people whose ancestors adhered to the cultural paradigms of Western Civilization (that is, primarily, European-Americans and Asian-Americans) are beyond excited about the prospect of those cultural tendencies being replaced by foreign ideals; an equally enormous segment of the population is active in their advocating the complete abandonment of the aforementioned cultural trends (Yes, I'm looking at most of you African- and Latin-Americans). The problems won't be fixed by closing the borders, as Conservatives suggest, but it certainly won't be fixed by opening the flood gates, an idea Liberals often pine after.

It will only be solved by one of two things: violence or separation. I'm guessing it's going to be both -- and we all know how that'll turn out (Texas wins. :P).

[Deleted]

Nobody here knows what may have been. saddam could have easily joined ISIS and USA prevented it by their actions. You just don't know, live with what we got and be thankful USA is a pretty chill superpower.

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So sad you truly believe that. Terrorists have a hard time sleeping true, but the others know USA is not out to get them. We have done so much to help them its absurd to even be accused of this. You see what you want not reality.

Saddam could have joined ISIS?
Do you even realize what the fuck you just said?
Please educate yourself on the relations between Saddam and islamic extremism.

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Pretty much this western Europe has been the biggest benefactor of U.S. foreign policy over the last 70 years. From the Marshall plan, protecting from the soviets, subsidizing defense, and guranteeing global economic security, western Europe has benefited greatly.

Hell, the one time Europe could have shown the world that they had the balls to stand up for its post WW2 values of protecting innocents (Kosovo and serbia) they dragged their feet and allowed ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Supertony, do you think the USA of today is the same USA of 75 years ago?
Do you think US actions in the last 25 years "guaranteed global economic security"?

[ringpriest]

Saddam could have joined ISIS?
Do you even realize what the fuck you just said?
Please educate yourself on the relations between Saddam and islamic extremism.

Oxymoron is living up to his name here, Saddam as dictator of Iraq would never have joined the Islamic State (although he was happy to pay lip service to fundamentalist Islam after he was weakened by our Gulf War). He would, however, have happily created and used ISIS as a front - exactly like what's left of his inner circle has been doing:
"The hidden hand behind the Islamic State militants? Saddam Hussein’s."

Even with the influx of thousands of foreign fighters, almost all of the leaders of the Islamic State are former Iraqi officers, including the members of its shadowy military and security committees, and the majority of its emirs and princes, according to Iraqis, Syrians and analysts who study the group

Note that this is not Baathists joining ISIS, it's Baathists using ISIS like a bloody, murderous puppet.

[Kallisto]

Pretty much this western Europe has been the biggest benefactor of U.S. foreign policy over the last 70 years. From the Marshall plan, protecting from the soviets, subsidizing defense, and guranteeing global economic security, western Europe has benefited greatly.

Hell, the one time Europe could have shown the world that they had the balls to stand up for its post WW2 values of protecting innocents (Kosovo and serbia) they dragged their feet and allowed ethnic cleansing and genocide.

Please the soviets were over extended already once they hit Germany. The only thing US foreign policy did for Britain was to basically tell them to get out of Suez or destroy the British economy. Kosovo was a war in which both sides were assholes trying to cleanse out the other. Croatia actually has the biggest post ww2 ethnic cleanse in Europe when it forced over 1/4 serbs from their homes something the west supported.

[taliey]

Cool, cool, reframing.

[Skroe]

Pro tip: america is NOT in charge, the american president is NOT the leader of the free WORLD, and the universe does NOT rotate around america's fat western ass.
Welcome to reality, america is ONE country in a long, long, long-long list of free countries and isn't even at the top of that list by a LONG shot.
I personally see it like this: Clowns to the north of me, jokers to the south here I am, stuck in the middle again.
Can't you both fuck off and get along america and russia?
It's shitty being in the middle of two neighbours who can't get along.
If that pisses you off, it's probably because the truth hurts.

It definetly is in charge.

I could talk about it being pretty much the only engine of the global economy.
I could talk about it's privleged position in the world bestowed by it's seats in the UN, WTO, IMF, NATO and other international organizations and security/trade treaties that give it prefferential treatement
I could talk about it's unmatched military might.
I could talk about how it has become ever more a center of finance and technology in the last decade and a half, not less, despite a globalized world.

But no, I'm going to talk about the one thing that underpins all of this: money.


America is in charge because it is fantastically wealthy. There is a positive feedback loop between the above and the creation of more wealth - and throw in being the third largest country (by population) in the world on top of that. America is a place with an obscene amount of money. In private and public hands.

Why is this important? Because ruling the world, so to speak, is expensive. It takes something on the scale of the $700 billion we pour into defense annually, to do it (a few years of a weak-on-forieign-policy President shows what happens when we don't). It takes the trillions of dollars the Federal reserve has in it's accounts. It takes the trillions of dollars our corporations and wall street turn into capital to finance programs the world order. Something a trite and as liberal as "economic foreign aid" is utterly dwarfed by the likes of an American company investing in a foreign country.

It's not one thing that gives America its position. It's a lot of things, small, medium and large, in summation that do it. And here's the rub: no one else is remotely close to rivaling that. No Russia and not China. Neither have anywhere near the resources, the money, or the access to do it in our stead. Here's a friendly comparison. Last year, at the height of the Ukrainian crisis, Russia had to cancel auctions of it's debt because of lack of demand. The US, by contrast, auctions tens of billions of debt every two weeks, in sales that conclude in seconds, because it's been found that rather than do an human-run sale (like Russia), it's better to have computers do it at high speed. That is what it means to be the center of the world - people want what you're selling.

American hegemony is a reality. It's expansive. It's expensive. It's flawed in many ways. It's very poorly served by Barack Obama, who is a historical abberation as far as Presidents go in his sckepticism of American power (but he's also history in 11 months). It's also challenged. Which is good. It's very, very good. I welcome the challenge. Patriotic Americans should welcome the challenge. Nothing motivates and unifies this diverse, fractious country like feeling under threat. The Peace of the Post Cold War got us fat and ineffiency and lax. We did lots of stupid ship. Already an era of our leadership contested has seen meaningful advances in defense spending, in economics, and in focus of our foreign policy to our core issues and away from the ones that matter less.

Our differences with Russia and China are substantial. Russia in particular is such an odd case because the metrics for it are so horrific. Russia needs to accept that losing war has consequences and the consequence of losing the Cold War was the end of the concept of Russia as a great power. They should focus on being a larger Germany. They'll have a happier, wealthier, stronger country than they will if they foolishly try to pretend they're still a superpower in a world where they're falling out of the top 10 economies, has less than $100 billion in annual defense spending, and have an aging population that is rapidly contracting (among many other failures). They need to know their place in a world order that the West built because Russia and it's Cold War allies lost, badly. And that is, as just another European country. More than that? They deserve to be reminded.

In Syria, and now with the bombing, Russia is learning a very hard lesson about the gap between it's ambitions and it's means.

And then there is Vladmir Putin. It's worth pointing the finger that the Putinistas of Russian origin here (rather than their useful "friends" in the West who hang on). Vladmir Putin is the leader of an authoritarian regime. Period. The Russians who post in this form and stick up for Vladmir Putin are sticking up for the man who rules them, basically as poperty, as he and his clique have personally enriched themselves in their hold on power. The West is, and I think should feel, profoundly dissapointed with the Russian people over how post-Cold War history has gone for them. Them falling back into the thrall of another charismatic Russian strongman is unbelievable. How many times does the same failure need to be repeated? Because this ends with another Russian regime falling, and another Western-friendly one trying to pick up the pieces, hoping against hope that the Russian people don't crumple in the face of economic hardship yet again.

Our differences with Russia are serious. Our differnces with Vladmir Putin are important. It would be the height of irresponsibility to just let bygones be bygones.

[Independent voter]

Putin said Russia's attack on the Syrian Sunnis wouldn't have repercussions on the Russian people, the downed airliner proves that wrong and is why Putin was so reluctant to give the reason for the downing as a terrorist attack.

It's amazing that Putin didn't insure Russian safety before attacking the Sunnis.

Russia doesn't have any money, as their occupation of Syria continues for another 2 to 4 years, that's a lot of money down the drain.

All ISIS has to do is stick it out until Russia decides to pack up and leave Syria.

[Skroe]

Putin said Russia's attack on the Syrian Sunnis wouldn't have repercussions on the Russian people, the downed airliner proves that wrong and is why Putin was so reluctant to give the reason for the downing as a terrorist attack.

It's amazing that Putin didn't insure Russian safety before attacking the Sunnis.

Russia doesn't have any money, as their occupation of Syria continues for another 2 to 4 years, that's a lot of money down the drain.

All ISIS has to do is stick it out until Russia decides to pack up and leave Syria.

Oh it gets even worse.

Russia made a massive strategic error in backing Assad's regime in Syria because with respect to Russia's interests, they chose the wrong side.

Supposing for a moment the US is looking to wash its hands of Middle Eastern entanglements to focus on Europe and Asia-Pacific, that would leave a wide opening for rival powers to move in and replace the US's interests with the regions core power players with their own. This would mean specifically, replace a US-Saudi Alliance with say a Russian-Saudi one.

In backing Assad, Russia screwed up to an absolutely unbelievable degree because they took the side AGAINST all the richest, most capable and most powerful countries in the region. They made themselves an enemy (if not an overt one) of the Saudis, the Gulf Arabs, and others. Sure the Putinistas - like Putin himself - will trot out some ridiculous photo op of Putin shaking hands with one king or another. Like those ever matter. In reality the entire region is going on buying sprees for US Military technology (not Russian). Saudi Arabia for example is about to buy Lockheed Martin built Littoral Combat Ships better than the ones that the US Navy is buying for a host of really dumb reasons.

But that's just business side. While Obama has all sorts of quaint hang-ups about the US giving weapons to kill people to others, the Arab enemies of Assad certainly do not. When they're able to obtain non-American MANPADS, say French or Chinese ones for example, on the global weapons market, they will send them to Syria, just as they've sent everything else they could get their hands on. And we'll start hearing about Mi-24s getting shot down.

If Russia had any brains, it would have sold out Assad years ago and made nice with the Saudis. But in the end, photo-ops are all Putin is going to get as the Arabs seek to depose his choice, and not particularly care how many Russian conscripts die in the process. But then again, it's not like Vladmir Putin or his Putinista supporters care about that little detail either.

This is from Brookings.
http://www.businessinsider.com/russi...-syria-2015-11

The Russian military intervention in Syria, launched in a great rush just over a month ago, came as a surprise — perhaps not as shocking as the swift occupation and annexation of Crimea, but a surprise nevertheless.

But does Russia’s ability to surprise and to project force in Syria prove, as Garret Campbell claims, that Western attempts “to discredit Russian military capabilities” were inaccurate?

In fact, the first month of the operation tells us little about Russian military capabilities. It does show that the Russian leadership is prepared to play with military instruments of policy way beyond the limit of, for Western politicians, acceptable risk.

This readiness to face big risks constitutes a political advantage of sorts. But it remains unclear that the Russian military is up to the task.

There are many looming disasters on the battlefield in Syria, and the Russian military will inevitably take the blame if they come to pass.

Reforms and rearmament
In hindsight, it is striking that at the start of this decade, when the key domestic political guideline in Russia was “modernization” (and foreign policy guideline was “reset”), the only real modernization that happened was that of the armed forces.

The military reform launched by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov began just a couple of months after the inglorious “victory” in the August 2008 war with Georgia. His replacement in November 2012 by Sergei Shoigu helped in correcting some mistakes in the incoherent design for reforms and also shifted the focus to combat training.

The improved combat readiness, particularly of Russian special forces, made it possible to execute the spectacular operation aimed at taking control over Crimea in March 2014. But many key parts of the military machine still remain under-reformed and untouched by modernization.

Reforms never come without pain, and it was the air force that suffered the most damage from the ill-conceived cuts and reorganizations. The decision to disband the traditional structure of air regiments and divisions, as well as organize enlarged air bases, created a situation where combat planes of dozens of different types and modifications are put together into an awkward system of maintenance.

The reforms also severely disrupted the process of higher education, so that presently very few new pilots and engineers graduate. The result has been an organizational and logistic nightmare that has produced a long series of crashes this summer, including the loss of two Tu-95MS strategic bombers. The latest entry in this sad track record was the loss of a MiG-31 fighter over Kamchatka last Saturday.

Massive rearmament was supposed to compensate for the disorganization caused by radical reforms. The air force was promised 350 new tactical aircraft and 1,000 helicopters by 2020. But as economic stagnation in Russia has taken hold, these plans are undergoing ad hoc revisions.

The order for the long-advertised fifth generation T-50 (PAK-FA) fighter was cut from 50 to just 12 planes, with an uncertain delivery date. And the increase of the transport aviation fleet had to be canceled because of the breakdown of cooperative ties with the Antonov design bureau in Ukraine.

A bold advance into the Syrian trap
Executing a limited intervention into the mutating Syrian civil war doesn’t challenge these assessments, even if it did produce an outsized political effect. It is important, as Garrett points out, not to see Russian capabilities through the lens of Western ways of warfare. But is also important to remember certain hard battlefield realities will impose themselves regardless of one’s way of war.

The Russian intervention in Syria is only possible at all because the “hybrid war” in Eastern Ukraine, which has tied up the bulk of Russian combat-capable battalions, has seen virtually no use of the air force. Moscow sought to use this free capacity for staging demonstrations of air power over the Baltic theater but encountered effective containment — it has since scaled down its provocations.

Syria appeared an easier option, and the deployment of an air regiment to the hastily prepared Hmeymym airbase outside Latakia went remarkably smoothly. As the air war has moved into the second month, however, issues with its trajectory have emerged.

The composition of the regiment (with a squadron of light Su-25SM fighter-bombers and a squadron of Mi-24 attack helicopters) makes it most suitable for close air support. But that kind of difficult mission only makes sense if it’s in support of a ground offensive by Syrian government forces, which have proven incapable of conducting any successful campaign.

Sustaining the air campaign at the present level may not be very expensive (conservative Russian estimate gives the figure of $2.5 million a day, compared to the roughly $9 million per day the United States spends on its anti-ISIS fight), but a technical setback is certain to hit sooner rather than later.

Escalation will be difficult because few other power projection options are available. The cruise missile salvo by the frigates of the Caspian flotilla on Russian President Vladimir Putin’s birthday was sensational, but it has seriously upset Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and so cannot be repeated. It had little resonance on the battlefield anyway. Expanding the scale of intervention would be logistically very difficult.

The Russian navy had to lease and purchase eight commercial transports in order to deliver supplies for the operation at the level of up to 50 sorties a day (which means one sortie per aircraft). Its only aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov is undergoing repairs (as it is most of the time), and the navy command could only dream of building an amphibious assault ship that would compare with Mistral-class ships, which France has refused to deliver.

The next steps for an over-stretched and abused military
The Russian regime’s plan has clearly been to use initial battlefield success to negotiate an end to the civil war from a position of strength. But alas there has been little initial battlefield success. ISIS and other parts of the opposition have already begun to mount counter-offensives.

And bringing the various sides together to negotiate appears as difficult as ever. If those negotiations fail, it will be hard for Russian leaders to find an opportunity to declare victory and go home.

But keeping the Russian military adventure going means waiting for a disaster to strike—and even with a high tolerance for risk, Putin has no stomach to take it. As the economy continues to sink, he needs new victories to keep the country mobilized around a patriotic agenda. And only military instruments work for his ambitious efforts to project strength from a position of weakness.

The deadlock in Donbas was successfully camouflaged with the Syrian adventure, but in the near future this new quagmire might need another distraction. Georgia might be chosen again as a target of convenience, but the fact of the matter is that there are fewer and fewer uncommitted military capabilities to wield.

The bottom line is that, for the sake of regime survival, Putin has fallen back to the “safe” position of military confrontation. But the Russian military is not able to prevail in that confrontation and the Russian economy cannot possibly sustain it.

Read the original article on The Brookings Institution. Copyright 2015. Follow The Brookings Institution on Twitter.

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Also more on the "World Order". You can stick a fork in the entire "BRIC" concept. Says who? Says the people who created the term.
http://www.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-is-ditching-its-bric-fund-2015-11

Fourteen years after coining a term that came to define emerging-market investing, Goldman Sachs has ditched the BRICs.

The firm is merging its BRIC fund — which invests in Brazil, Russia, India, and China — with a broader emerging-markets fund, according to a September SEC filing first reported by Bloomberg.

"Over last decade emerging market investing has evolved from being tactical and opportunistic to being a strategic part of most asset allocations," Goldman Sachs spokesperson Andrew Williams told Business Insider.

"We continue to recommend that our clients have exposure to emerging markets across asset classes as part of their strategic asset allocation."

The "BRIC" acronym was first used by former Goldman Sachs Chief Economist Jim O'Neill (now Lord Jim O'Neill) to draw attention to four emerging economies he saw as stand outs.

He coined the term in 2001 in an economics paper titled "Building Better Global Economic BRICs."

It quickly became part of Wall Street's vernacular, and marked the start of an investment boom in the four markets.

The acronym was used to frame conversations around all emerging markets, with investors spending as much time wondering what country (like Indonesia for example) would be the next BRIC as they did salivating over the profits to be made as Brazilians and Chinese joined the global middle class.

It also inspired a few copycats (EAGLEs, for example, is a group of "emerging and growth leading economies"), though none were quite as catchy.

The term's usage has expanded outside of the investment community also, with the four countries and South Africa (making it BRICS) recently banding together to form a development bank as an alternative to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Goldman only launched its BRIC fund in 2006. It peaked in 2010, according to the Bloomberg report, and has since lost 88% of its assets.

Earlier this year, O'Neill said he would no longer group the four "BRIC" countries together and predicted that Brazil and Russia could soon be kicked out of the club.

Since that prediction, China has seen a stock market crash and growth problems of its own. That country is now set for its weakest expansion since 1990, according to Bloomberg.

Now, Goldman believes that a combined BRIC and emerging market equity fund "would be better positioned for asset growth" than a standalone BRIC fund, according to the filing.

And thus ends that era.

[Deleted]

I think ur totally wrong n stuff, skroe, too much caffeine not good for u, u over-dramatize like fuck about reality as u fantasy it.

[Deleted]

I fear for the future of our little planet if skroe's rambling find a place in the political scenario. Which they do, and as such, I fear for the future of our little planet.

[Crispin]

I think ur totally wrong n stuff, skroe, too much caffeine not good for u, u over-dramatize like fuck about reality as u fantasy it.

No u r wrong.

[Ilir]

Meh as long as I can still do what I enjoy doing, I don't really care.

(yeah I know that's not the most honorable thing to say but it's the truth)

[ringpriest]

Oh it gets even worse.

Russia made a massive strategic error in backing Assad's regime in Syria because with respect to Russia's interests, they chose the wrong side.

Supposing for a moment the US is looking to wash its hands of Middle Eastern entanglements to focus on Europe and Asia-Pacific, that would leave a wide opening for rival powers to move in and replace the US's interests with the regions core power players with their own. This would mean specifically, replace a US-Saudi Alliance with say a Russian-Saudi one.

In backing Assad, Russia screwed up to an absolutely unbelievable degree because they took the side AGAINST all the richest, most capable and most powerful countries in the region. They made themselves an enemy (if not an overt one) of the Saudis, the Gulf Arabs, and others. Sure the Putinistas - like Putin himself - will trot out some ridiculous photo op of Putin shaking hands with one king or another. Like those ever matter. In reality the entire region is going on buying sprees for US Military technology (not Russian). Saudi Arabia for example is about to buy Lockheed Martin built Littoral Combat Ships better than the ones that the US Navy is buying for a host of really dumb reasons.

But that's just business side. While Obama has all sorts of quaint hang-ups about the US giving weapons to kill people to others, the Arab enemies of Assad certainly do not. When they're able to obtain non-American MANPADS, say French or Chinese ones for example, on the global weapons market, they will send them to Syria, just as they've sent everything else they could get their hands on. And we'll start hearing about Mi-24s getting shot down.

If Russia had any brains, it would have sold out Assad years ago and made nice with the Saudis. But in the end, photo-ops are all Putin is going to get as the Arabs seek to depose his choice, and not particularly care how many Russian conscripts die in the process. But then again, it's not like Vladmir Putin or his Putinista supporters care about that little detail either.

This is from Brookings.
http://www.businessinsider.com/russi...-syria-2015-11

I think the Brookings' piece goes a little far down the wish-fulfillment lane - certainly, the possibility of a loss by Assad (and consequent hit to Russian prestige) is real, but far from guaranteed. The minimum threshold for Putin & Co to proclaim some sort of "victory" is to stabilize the rump Syria and/or cut a deal which they can take credit for. And lo and behold, negotiations for such a deal started back in late October. (And its a good thing the Russians do have that option to fall back to, because so far, Assad and company seem to lack the manpower or ability to take advantage on the ground from Russian air power, though not for lack of trying.)

Now, the Saudis... I think you're way off there. The hereditary dictatorship in Riyadh is looking like its in big trouble: pumping oil desperately while its (massive) cash reserves shrink faster than Russia's, there's unrest bubbling in its most oil-rich provinces as blowback from ISIS starts to trickle back into the Kingdom, and, far worse, it's vicious, criminal, and farcical invasion of Yemen (despite lots of mercenaries and US assistance) is bogged down, helping Al Qaeda and ISIS (probably a feature from the perspective of the evil morons in charge of Arabia), while the Yemenis hit back across the border. The willingness to fork over cash for Littoral Combat Shits (even the "frigate" version is a terrible ship that makes the F-35 look great by comparison) is, at best, a pure bribe (I pity even Saudi royals on one in a shooting war). The current king's branch of the family is utterly oblivious - a coup is brewing, and the smarter members of Arabia's ruling family are packing their bags.

There's a real possibility for Putin dream scenario to come true: a collapsing Saudi Arabia (with or without help from ISIS or Russia); if he can get that, oil prices will skyrocket (to Russia's benefit), and US influence will wane (particularly in the Gulf). For that possibility alone, I suspect the Syrian venture is worth the risk.

[Independent voter]

Here we are again, Americans backing America and Russians backing the Russians, surprise, surprise.

[Stormdash]

"Gosh darn imperialism, we should do away with it!"
-people that directly benefit from imperialism but don't realize it

Worse than that, are so ignorant of what imperial colonialism actually looked like in practice by the British, French, and Spanish that they actually think it's meaningfully analogous to US foreign policy post-WWII.

[Skroe]

I think the Brookings' piece goes a little far down the wish-fulfillment lane - certainly, the possibility of a loss by Assad (and consequent hit to Russian prestige) is real, but far from guaranteed. The minimum threshold for Putin & Co to proclaim some sort of "victory" is to stabilize the rump Syria and/or cut a deal which they can take credit for. And lo and behold, negotiations for such a deal started back in late October. (And its a good thing the Russians do have that option to fall back to, because so far, Assad and company seem to lack the manpower or ability to take advantage on the ground from Russian air power, though not for lack of trying.)

You're reading too much into these talks. These are just typical "negotiations" so that all sides can try and build up the moral and political edifice of their broader strategies. During both World Wars, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War... any war really... the "talks" never stopped, even as sides were butchering each other.

I mean these talks will go no where because it's in no party's interest for them to go anywhere. The Arabs want Assad gone. The US wants to avoid an expensive entanglement.

Now, the Saudis... I think you're way off there. The hereditary dictatorship in Riyadh is looking like its in big trouble: pumping oil desperately while its (massive) cash reserves shrink faster than Russia's, there's unrest bubbling in its most oil-rich provinces as blowback from ISIS starts to trickle back into the Kingdom, and, far worse, it's vicious, criminal, and farcical invasion of Yemen (despite lots of mercenaries and US assistance) is bogged down, helping Al Qaeda and ISIS (probably a feature from the perspective of the evil morons in charge of Arabia), while the Yemenis hit back across the border.

The Saudis are in rough shape, but I wouldn't underestimate them. The regime are notorious survivors. Furthermore their difficulties don't translate into difficulties for Qatar and the UAE.

And on top of that, MANPADS are cheap and flooding Syria with weapons of all type - also cheap - has been going on for years. Domestic difficulties wouldn't likely change any of that.

The willingness to fork over cash for Littoral Combat Shits (even the "frigate" version is a terrible ship that makes the F-35 look great by comparison) is, at best, a pure bribe (I pity even Saudi royals on one in a shooting war).

Wellllllllllll, I'm not sure if you know what differentiates the basline LCS, the marines "Frigate" upgunned LCS, and the Saudi LCS. An easy distinction is they represent in terms of armament, basically, light, medium and heavy. Baseline LCSs have little. The FF/LCS will have Harpoon or the Naval Strike Missile. The Saudi LCS will have 16 Vertical Launch Systems, quad packed with 64 RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles.

The Saudi LCS is the LCS done right. If the US built it for itself, it could carry Standard Missiles as well. It's worth noting that in a world where the US bought it or retrofitted the fleet, the new "Frigate" in the US Navy would be more capable than the Frigate they were replacing, which though well armored, had no VLS and were lightly armed.

That's not happening though, at least right now. And while arming the FF/LCS with the Naval Strike Missile will make them certainly better surface combatants than the OHP-class frigate, they're still far too lightly armored.

The LCS is actually a good buy for the Saudis though. It gives them semi-Destroyer level striking power on a budget.

Personally I'd never defend the LCS, but since we're committed to it, we should absolutely buy the Saudi one. Why doesn't the Navy do it? Probably the same reason it doesn't want to buy Diesel submarines or smaller carriers - it would call into question the efficacy of spending on their larger more capable cousins (like Destroyers in this case).

There's a real possibility for Putin dream scenario to come true: a collapsing Saudi Arabia (with or without help from ISIS or Russia); if he can get that, oil prices will skyrocket (to Russia's benefit), and US influence will wane (particularly in the Gulf). For that possibility alone, I suspect the Syrian venture is worth the risk.

I think the chances of this are a lot smaller than you may think. The Saudis last line of defense is the Saudi Arabian National Guard, which is essentially a private tribal army loyal to the King, independent of the Armed forces and armed with the latest and best equipment. If all else fails, it would defend the regime to the very end.

I think you also need to be careful overestimating Putin's ability to engineer or afford any of this.

[ringpriest]

And then there is Vladmir Putin. It's worth pointing the finger that the Putinistas of Russian origin here (rather than their useful "friends" in the West who hang on). Vladmir Putin is the leader of an authoritarian regime. Period. The Russians who post in this form and stick up for Vladmir Putin are sticking up for the man who rules them, basically as poperty, as he and his clique have personally enriched themselves in their hold on power. The West is, and I think should feel, profoundly dissapointed with the Russian people over how post-Cold War history has gone for them. Them falling back into the thrall of another charismatic Russian strongman is unbelievable. How many times does the same failure need to be repeated? Because this ends with another Russian regime falling, and another Western-friendly one trying to pick up the pieces, hoping against hope that the Russian people don't crumple in the face of economic hardship yet again.

Our differences with Russia are serious. Our differnces with Vladmir Putin are important. It would be the height of irresponsibility to just let bygones be bygones.

Point of order: Russian (and Putin's government) is not simply authoritarian in the classical sense of one-person rule, and its on the edges (if not beyond them) of any modern definition of authoritarian government. What Russia is not is truly democratic, liberal, or free - it's a hybrid, with aspects of managed democracy, overlapping oligarchies, and a strong degree of plain, old-fashioned populism bordering on fascism. While Putin may act the role of neo-Tsar for reasons of ego, or PR, his actual role is to be both front-man for the siloviki and to actually be the chief executive of Russia, while balancing the various other factions. (I know that here in the USA, where many people have grown to adulthood under Bush & Obama, the idea of a chief executive who is even semi-competent at his nominal job is a novel one, but its totally a thing that actually happens in governments around the world.) And in both those jobs, Putin is not the only vote (though he may well be the deciding vote) - he works with a cabal apparently reasonably capable subordinates whose opinions do matter (though whether on not any of them is capable of replacing Putin as executive and Head of State, I don't know).

Seeing Putin as Stalin (which is the tendency here in the US, though I don't know if it's exactly what you meant when you tossed off authoritarian) is a dangerously bad idea, because its wrong, and thus encourages bad decision making on our side of the pond.

Also, the idea that they need "the Good Tsar" to save them and Mother Russia is as deeply inculcated in the Russian public as the idea that we're a free and democratic republic that's controlled by merit-based opportunity is here in the US.

[Skroe]

Point of order: Russian (and Putin's government) is not simply authoritarian in the classical sense of one-person rule, and its on the edges (if not beyond them) of any modern definition of authoritarian government. What Russia is not is truly democratic, liberal, or free - it's a hybrid, with aspects of managed democracy, overlapping oligarchies, and a strong degree of plain, old-fashioned populism bordering on fascism. While Putin may act the role of neo-Tsar for reasons of ego, or PR, his actual role is to be both front-man for the siloviki and to actually be the chief executive of Russia, while balancing the various other factions.

Well yes exactly. I've talked about that myself in these threads many times. That's exactly what Russia is, which in my view, makes it even worse, because it means the rot of Russia is endemic to it and will not easily be removed via any number of elections or a reformist leader. Replacing Putin isn't enough. Ultimately the biggest losers in this are Russians themselves.

It however, may be more centralized than we think. US intelligence leaks reported that the thinking is Putin ordered the invasion of Crimea basically on a whim, because he lost his temper, without consulting the broader Russian defense establishment first.

(I know that here in the USA, where many people have grown to adulthood under Bush & Obama, the idea of a chief executive who is even semi-competent at his nominal job is a novel one, but its totally a thing that actually happens in governments around the world.) And in both those jobs, Putin is not the only vote (though he may well be the deciding vote) - he works with a cabal apparently reasonably capable subordinates whose opinions do matter (though whether on not any of them is capable of replacing Putin as executive and Head of State, I don't know).

The Cabal as it were, is believed to be small. As in about five people. And we've discussed before the problem of Putin's succession. He's getting older. And in classical Russian Leader fashion, he isn't preparing for the inevitable future of Russia without Putin.

Seeing Putin as Stalin (which is the tendency here in the US, though I don't know if it's exactly what you meant when you tossed off authoritarian) is a dangerously bad idea, because its wrong, and thus encourages bad decision making on our side of the pond.

He's not a Stalin. He's maybe something of a Nasser with a dash of Milosevic? The differences between Stalin and Putin are vast. But I would say Putin is in his own way, as unacceptable to the modern world.

The problem though really isn't Putin, or Stalin or whoever else. It's Russia's romantic vision of itself as a nation of destiny. The Russian Empire, The Soviet Union, the Russian Federation - all are expressions of the dame old dream of Russian Imperialism, ruling this artificially vast accident of history from Europe to the Pacific Ocean. The problem is history didn't work out like that. The West got richer and more advanced. It's relative power climbed and climbed while Russia spent the better part of the 20th century combating intrinsic backwardism. It was, for example, agrarian long after Europe went industrial. And it's always been poor and late to the game - be it with industrialization 80 years ago, economic reforms twenty years ago, or it's place in the global economy today.

Sooner or later Russia is going to have to give it up. It is too poor to run an Empire. Its geography - bordered by rich/advanced Europe in the West, the Arc of Instability in the south, and Rich/powerful China in the East, with the US on all sides (and above it in space) is a intrinsic constraint against Empire building. It doesn't have the population or the resources to run an Empire. It doesn't hold privileged positions of power. In fact, aside from Nuclear Weapons - which it inherited from a legitimate Superpower that WAS many of those things above (but lost them) - it has fewer tools than most European countries a quarter it's size in terms of population.

A couple of years ago (when the Euro crisis was at it's peak) the Economics made a brilliant point about Germany. Twice in the 20th Century, Germany tried to become the center of Europe and run it as it's Empire. And yet here we are in the early 21st and Germany was being given the keys to the Kingdom of Europe, and they didn't want it, content to build Fortress Germany into a vision for the world.

That should be Russia. It makes so much more sense for Russia than empire building. But it would require a change in national psychology, because otherwise Putin will just be followed by another figure of the same mold who will try and do the same old mischief, but this time with even fewer resources than Putin has, owing to Russia's dire economic future and shrinking population.

Also, the idea that they need "the Good Tsar" to save them and Mother Russia is as deeply inculcated in the Russian public as the idea that we're a free and democratic republic that's controlled by merit-based opportunity is here in the US.

I hope you're not establishing any kind of moral equivalency between the US's many, perfections, failures, delusions and contradictions, and the one big thing that has done more to wreck Russia's past, present and future than anything else. I mean the Soviet Union tried to do that whole ridiculous bit through the entire Cold War - for example exploiting the counter culture and civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s as anti-democratic propaganda in order to bolster their own regimes legitimacy.

Even at our worst, our way of life and beliefs have a far greater degree of moral legitimacy than Russia's.

[ringpriest]

Well yes exactly. I've talked about that myself in these threads many times. That's exactly what Russia is, which in my view, makes it even worse, because it means the rot of Russia is endemic to it and will not easily be removed via any number of elections or a reformist leader. Replacing Putin isn't enough. Ultimately the biggest losers in this are Russians themselves.

It however, may be more centralized than we think. US intelligence leaks reported that the thinking is Putin ordered the invasion of Crimea basically on a whim, because he lost his temper, without consulting the broader Russian defense establishment first.


The Cabal as it were, is believed to be small. As in about five people. And we've discussed before the problem of Putin's succession. He's getting older. And in classical Russian Leader fashion, he isn't preparing for the inevitable future of Russia without Putin.

If Crimea was done on a whim, then NATO needs to be scared shitless right now, because either the Russians are the luckiest army on the planet, or their 4th gen spec-ops are too good for words. But, my own SWAG is that it wasn't off the cuff - sure, the final Go-No Go may have been Putin's sole call, but I can't believe that they didn't have a "what if we might lose Sevastopol" plan sitting around, and that they started putting the pieces in place as the Maidan protests ramped up. That would mean that they implemented (well) an existing, updated plan with a couple months to set up. Not nearly as scary.

As for succession... idk; I'm not up to date enough on my Kremlinology to make any sort of educated guess. It certainly could be bad. It does remind me of the old (possibly apocryphal) line about Krushchev - that his greatest success was that he was peacefully ousted (with a vote of the Politburo!) and there was no question or threat about the continuity of government.

He's not a Stalin. He's maybe something of a Nasser with a dash of Milosevic? The differences between Stalin and Putin are vast. But I would say Putin is in his own way, as unacceptable to the modern world.

The problem though really isn't Putin, or Stalin or whoever else. It's Russia's romantic vision of itself as a nation of destiny. The Russian Empire, The Soviet Union, the Russian Federation - all are expressions of the dame old dream of Russian Imperialism, ruling this artificially vast accident of history from Europe to the Pacific Ocean. The problem is history didn't work out like that. The West got richer and more advanced. It's relative power climbed and climbed while Russia spent the better part of the 20th century combating intrinsic backwardism. It was, for example, agrarian long after Europe went industrial. And it's always been poor and late to the game - be it with industrialization 80 years ago, economic reforms twenty years ago, or it's place in the global economy today.

Sooner or later Russia is going to have to give it up. It is too poor to run an Empire. Its geography - bordered by rich/advanced Europe in the West, the Arc of Instability in the south, and Rich/powerful China in the East, with the US on all sides (and above it in space) is a intrinsic constraint against Empire building. It doesn't have the population or the resources to run an Empire. It doesn't hold privileged positions of power. In fact, aside from Nuclear Weapons - which it inherited from a legitimate Superpower that WAS many of those things above (but lost them) - it has fewer tools than most European countries a quarter it's size in terms of population.

A couple of years ago (when the Euro crisis was at it's peak) the Economics made a brilliant point about Germany. Twice in the 20th Century, Germany tried to become the center of Europe and run it as it's Empire. And yet here we are in the early 21st and Germany was being given the keys to the Kingdom of Europe, and they didn't want it, content to build Fortress Germany into a vision for the world.

That should be Russia. It makes so much more sense for Russia than empire building. But it would require a change in national psychology, because otherwise Putin will just be followed by another figure of the same mold who will try and do the same old mischief, but this time with even fewer resources than Putin has, owing to Russia's dire economic future and shrinking population.

I think that Russia would absolutely benefit from a sort of "friendly non-interventionism" - of course, I think the same thing about the US. But unlike the United States, where our national traumas are pretty minor entries on the scales of global geopolitical horror, the Russian collective unconscious is paranoid about invasion, and whether its right or wrong, they have solid reasons for that paranoia: Genghis Khan and Hitler, come to mind as two prominent examples, but they are far from the only ones. Even the United States has invaded Russia in the last century.

And I would caution against putting too much stock in 'Russian backwardness' - Russians come at modern combat tech from a different angle than the NATO powers do. And solid designs plus morale can win wars, and can be more effective than technical advantages - just ask the Nazis about that (there were other factors in play as well, but more recent Western military history tends to obsess about how high-tech the third Reich was, and neglect things like production and availability numbers).

I hope you're not establishing any kind of moral equivalency between the US's many, perfections, failures, delusions and contradictions, and the one big thing that has done more to wreck Russia's past, present and future than anything else. I mean the Soviet Union tried to do that whole ridiculous bit through the entire Cold War - for example exploiting the counter culture and civil rights movements of the 1960s and 1970s as anti-democratic propaganda in order to bolster their own regimes legitimacy.

Moral equivalency? No, though I think the present difference is closer to being one of degree than kind; but if you step back and look at the sweep of history, the US has on the balance been far better governed that Russia over the last two centuries and change. Right now, I think that Russia's corruption and fake democracy look crude and unsophisticated compared to ours.

[oxymoronic]

If Crimea was done on a whim, then NATO needs to be scared shitless right now, because either the Russians are the luckiest army on the planet, or their 4th gen spec-ops are too good for words. But, my own SWAG is that it wasn't off the cuff - sure, the final Go-No Go may have been Putin's sole call, but I can't believe that they didn't have a "what if we might lose Sevastopol" plan sitting around, and that they started putting the pieces in place as the Maidan protests ramped up. That would mean that they implemented (well) an existing, updated plan with a couple months to set up. Not nearly as scary.

As for succession... idk; I'm not up to date enough on my Kremlinology to make any sort of educated guess. It certainly could be bad. It does remind me of the old (possibly apocryphal) line about Krushchev - that his greatest success was that he was peacefully ousted (with a vote of the Politburo!) and there was no question or threat about the continuity of government.



I think that Russia would absolutely benefit from a sort of "friendly non-interventionism" - of course, I think the same thing about the US. But unlike the United States, where our national traumas are pretty minor entries on the scales of global geopolitical horror, the Russian collective unconscious is paranoid about invasion, and whether its right or wrong, they have solid reasons for that paranoia: Genghis Khan and Hitler, come to mind as two prominent examples, but they are far from the only ones. Even the United States has invaded Russia in the last century.

And I would caution against putting too much stock in 'Russian backwardness' - Russians come at modern combat tech from a different angle than the NATO powers do. And solid designs plus morale can win wars, and can be more effective than technical advantages - just ask the Nazis about that (there were other factors in play as well, but more recent Western military history tends to obsess about how high-tech the third Reich was, and neglect things like production and availability numbers).





Moral equivalency? No, though I think the present difference is closer to being one of degree than kind; but if you step back and look at the sweep of history, the US has on the balance been far better governed that Russia over the last two centuries and change. Right now, I think that Russia's corruption and fake democracy look crude and unsophisticated compared to ours.

lol not sure why you write all this stuff, not one person reads it