General Macarthur at Bataan /Corregidor

[sarahtasher]

(This topic is inspired a bit by the upcoming HOI IV, who market heavily General Macarthur as the equivalent of Zhukov, Montgommery or Rommel, which might be overstating the matter)

Generally speaking, whatever were the ulterior capacities of Macarthur in the Pacific, was he the right man for the utterly thankless job of defending the Philippines in 1941 ?

It have to be said first that the outcome itself of the campaign would have been likely the same whoever had been in command-the Philippines were utterly undefensible on the long run without naval superiority. The IJA failed to do it with close to half a million men, it's very doubtful that anyone could have done it with maybe 40 000 trained men. Also, whatever were Macarthur actual command capacities, he was very skilled at diplomacy (maybe not that much with other allied powers/his own government), which was proven abundantly later in the occupation of Japan.

That said, while of course it's easy to say this with hindsight, the whole defence of the Philippines was fatally flawed, even taking in consideration the nearly suicidal overconfidence toward the Japaneses,

War Plan Orange and it's variations had correctly identified the likely starting moves of the Pacific War, and that Manilla could not be held with the available forces (and/or that sending reinforcments would merely had more casualties/POWs). Hence the whole withdrawal to Bataan/Corregidor. That nothing was done till 1935 (or 1936, where it became clear that Japan was not interested anymore in following the Washington Naval Treaty, which prevented a buildup of forces in the Pacific Islands) to build even minimal fortifications (not really needed) or depot (sorely needed...) is hard to excuse. That very little was done after the establishment of the Phlippines Army is even harder to excuse, not to mention the promotion of the widely irrealist plan of defending all the Philippines.

As said, all of this can be justified with ''you say that with the benefit of hinsight''. True. The thing is, Macarthur made catastrophic decisions well after it was clear that his defence strategy would not work-his modest airforce was wrecked hours after Pearl Harbor (on the ground...). Pearl Harbor itself meant that no naval help and supplies would come in a foreseeable future. Between 8th december and 21th december, Macarthur bet everything (mostly, the lives of it's own men) on a foward defence of Luzon, a plan of course completely incompatible with withdrawing toward Bataan. Supplies were not even moved until the Luzon landings. It's not like it was an impossible task-Mariveles (the main harbour of Bataan) and Corregidor were fifty kilometres away from Manilla by sea. The paltry amount of supplies that was finally moved toward Bataan/Corregidor (from the 24th december to 2nd january) was done with the harbour under nearly constant air attack.

TLDR : The Corregidor/Bataan scheme was correctly identified in the 20s as the best possible strategy. No defence line, supply or infrastructure were built/moved there during all the interwar (granted, it would have been against the Washington Naval Treaty...but then again, it did not prevented the excavation of the Malinta Tunnel). Nothing was done when it became clear in 1936 that there would be a war in the Pacific. Even after the fall of France and renewed Japanese expansion in the region (Indochina), the Americans, at the behest of Macarthur, indulged into fantasies of defending the whole archipel with rather minuscule forces (instead of preparing better for the Bataan/Corregidor plan). Even after the sinking of the US Pacific Fleet and the destruction of the Far East Air Force, Macarthur still made little to none preparation for withdrawing to defensible positions-he sent only supplies nearly two weeks after the war declaration (or lack thereoff).

[Foosha]

...Ok?

Well while we are on the topic, Montgommery wasnt that good of a general either

[Kellhound]

...Ok?

Well while we are on the topic, Montgommery wasnt that good of a general either

He only names one really good general: Rommel.

MacArthur was not a very good general, and his desire to avenge his loss in the Philippines caused the US to use the wrong strategy in the Pacific.

[sarahtasher]

He only names one really good general: Rommel.

MacArthur was not a very good general, and his desire to avenge his loss in the Philippines caused the US to use the wrong strategy in the Pacific.

I hate to tell you that, but as Zhukov, Mongommery and Macarthur ended up winning the war, they must have been not that bad. That's like people saying that Grant and Sherman were awful compared to Lee...they, uh, won.

(General Macarthur was obviously much better when in charge of well supplied and well armed forces)

[Kellhound]

I hate to tell you that, but as Zhukov, Mongommery and Macarthur ended up winning the war, they must have been not that bad. That's like people saying that Grant and Sherman were awful compared to Lee...they, uh, won.

(General Macarthur was obviously much better when in charge of well supplied and well armed forces)

Winning and being a good general are two different things. In the case of Mac, it prolonged the Pacific War.

[Azadina]

Que forward to Korean conflict, "nuke China" is what you'd call being good at diplomacy?

[Deleted]

I hate to tell you that, but as Zhukov, Mongommery and Macarthur ended up winning the war, they must have been not that bad. That's like people saying that Grant and Sherman were awful compared to Lee...they, uh, won.

With the advantage in production capacity and numbers, you, Tennisace or a chipmunk could have won the war eventually.

[Puupi]

With the advantage in production capacity and numbers, you, Tennisace or a chipmunk could have won the war eventually.

If I was a chipmunk, I'd be insulted.

[sarahtasher]

The insult toward Canadian posters aside, there are plenty of generals that were unable to use modern means of war-including French ones (yes, laugh) on WW2, who were quite unable to use correctly their superior tanks. General sGrant and Sherman were much more capable than previous Union ones to use superior numbers to crush the ennemy.

But I suppose it's going to be ''SJW'' to state that actually winning the war might be a good criteria to rank generals.

- - - Updated - - -

Que forward to Korean conflict, "nuke China" is what you'd call being good at diplomacy?

I concede the point, but Macarthur did a surprising good job in Japan.

[HAcoreRD]

I hate to tell you that, but as Zhukov, Mongommery and Macarthur ended up winning the war, they must have been not that bad. That's like people saying that Grant and Sherman were awful compared to Lee...they, uh, won.

(General Macarthur was obviously much better when in charge of well supplied and well armed forces)

would that make Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Issac Brock bad generals?

[sarahtasher]

would that make Napoleon, Stonewall Jackson, and Issac Brock bad generals?

Napoléon was not beat, despite popular wisdom on the matter, by Russian winter, but by criminally underestimating the Russians and/or giving very little concern to material needs of his army. He was also defeated by refusing steadfastly to delegate authority to marshals with genuine capacities for independent command (like Davout or Masséna) prefering yes-man obeying blindly (Ney, Gouvion Saint Cyr...)

Like Rommel or Lee, generals that give very little thought to supply and logistics but are flamboyant tactical masterminds tend to lose on the long run against one that are merely competent tactically but take care of those aspects.

[Independent voter]

MacArthur was no Belasarius.

We should've took the choke chain off him in '50.

[sarahtasher]

BTW, the point was merely that Macarthur did catastrophic mistakes leading to Bataan...and boy, was PR savy enough to hide it.

[PaladinBash]

I'd say he was very cocky and knew how to market himself extremely well. I think he believed that a forward defence would work based on that arrogance and too much faith in his leadership abilities which, if they were as prodigious as he assumed, would have made him defend the place most likely to be held the best. I wouldn't even say it was a gamble because there was almost no chance of it working, he had a viable and sensible alternative and he did not react to clear signs it was a bad idea. That's just repeating bad decisions.

That said, he had a massive personality that was almost cultlike at times and he promoted himself to everyone important the way so many otherwise good leaders fail to do.