firearms actually perform against invaders. (this is obviously inspired by the discussion of another thread)
You might casually dismiss that as ''lol, French'', but hey
In 1870, Imperial France foolishly declared war to the Prussians. Outnumbered nearly two to one by the Germans and with at best mediocre generals, the result were a foregone conclusion. Within weeks of the war opening, the Imperial armies were repulsed from Alsace and Lorraine, and either bessieged (at Metz) or routed, reformed and then destroyed (at Sedan)
With only a corps left of regulars (troupes de ligne), maybe 20 000 men and a spattering of other well trained troops (gendarmes-the national police force of France was and is always part of the military, marines, sailors to crew guns), the Imperial regime collapsed and a national defence regime was put to repulse the Germans. Almost entirely made of French Républicains (little to do with Republicans), the National Defence based it's scheme on a idea based on something deeply idealized, the levée en masse from the Revolution, depicted by them as ''the people of France rise spontaneously against the invader and repel them by sheer numbers'' (does that remind you of something ?). The said Républicains had ironically sabotaged every attempt by the Imperials to reform the army by introducing a Prussian-like conscription system, to actually train people before sending them against the Germans.
(The 1867 plan by Marshal Niel to reform the army included building a 400 000 strong garde mobile that would have been somewhat the equivalent of the modern American national guard-more or less reservists that could take front line position if needed. But everyone, from the army that disliked the idea as too modern to the Républicains that opposed it because it was the Imperials to the Royalists that had to say no because it was not like under Louis XVI, sabotaged the project, the Républicains wanting a French style national guard, based on the revolution one, that would be much more akin to the Minutemen in concept-lots of patriotism and little of training, and not very willing to fight except for their hometown)
With the barely trained Mobiles that were not very mobiles at all (and usually quite drunk in the case of the Parisian ones), the Défense Nationale, soon to be bessieged in Paris, proclaimed the said levée en masse-everyone willing to fight for France was to enlist (not that it was really a choice to say no), either in regular armies raised hapharzadly in the provinces or in the newly minted all-volunteer National Guard-where people chose their own officers.
Paris soon raised a 400 000 strong National Guard. Considering that the bessieging Prussians were never more than 200 000 around Paris, that Paris was at the time one of the most fortified cities in the world with a ring of fortresses that were only slightly outdated, it should have been somewhat easy to break the siege with all those patriots willing to die for France, in the National Guard and in the dozens of free miltiias and corps forming around the country. The French Army even did had an advantage in weapons, still having ten of thousands of the ultra-modern Chassepot rifle, with twice the range of a Prussian Dreyse
What happened is this
-The Parisian National Guard proved completely worthless, with zero training and even less discipline-they spent most of the siege making trouble for the government instead of fighting the Prussians
-The said guard was quite good for parading with their uniforms and weapons in Paris, quite less willing to leave the walls to fight the Prussians
-The dozens of miltias that sprung in the countryside either skulked away when Prussians with cavalry and artillery came, or tried to fight and proved no match to troops that were minimally trained by modern standards. (That most franc tireurs and partisans considered that a chain of command was an outdated way to wage war did not helped)
-Despite three attempts to break the siege of Paris by massive sorties (in each case with the national guard melting away at the first shot and the regulars/mobiles having to fight heavily outgunned), the concept of ''levée en masse'' failed to work again and again.
So, let's summarize. In an age without aircraft and tanks, a 400 000 strong armed mob proved completely outmatched by a conscription army with very limited training by modern standards despite (verbally) ardent patriotism. The said mob proved about as helpless against the defeated French Army during the Commune.