Thomas Piketty, the French economist whose 2013 bestseller Capital in the 21st Century awoke upscale Americans to the shocking news that their economic system was not working for everyone, has written a new paper exposing more uncomfortable truths.
Piketty's new essay, called Brahmin Left vs. Merchant Right, studied electoral trends in three Western countries – France, Britain and the U.S. – dating back to the 1940s.
Even though the three countries have different systems, all three feature electoral showdowns for executive power that broadly come down to "left" versus "right" factions.
A remarkable feature is how mathematically balanced these elections have been over the years. Piketty notes that even in France, whose final votes involve coalitions of multiple minority parties, the widest disparity observed in recent history involved splits of ten points (De Gaulle vs. Mitterand in 1965) and eight (Mitterand vs. Chirac in 1988). More often, he notes, the splits have been 51-49, 52-48, etc.
This mimics the remarkable closeness of American elections. Four times in recent history, we've had presidential elections end either in nearly perfect statistical ties (Kennedy-Nixon in 1960, Nixon-Humphrey in 1968) or in contests close enough where there was a disparity between electoral and popular votes (Bush-Gore 2000, and Clinton-Trump 2016).
As Noam Chomsky wrote after the Bush/Gore fiasco, about the only scenario where you'd expect to see a contest of a hundred-plus million voters end in a statistical tie would either be a completely random process, or one where voters were asked to make a choice about something totally unrelated to their lives, like the presidency of Mars.
That we've had the flipped coin land virtually on its side so many times has always suggested something was off about our political system. Piketty now hints at what that was.
He writes that across all three countries, we've seen the evolution of the same trend. Fifty or sixty years ago, voting with the "left-wing" side (which he terms the socialist/labour/democratic parties) tended to be associated with low income and low education. Conversely, high education and high-income voters in all three countries voted right.
Over the years, however, the "left-wing" has become more and more associated with higher-education voters, giving rise to what he calls a "multiple-elite" party system.
According to Piketty, in 2016, for the first time – and of course some of this has to do with the unique repugnance of Donald Trump – the upper 10% of voters, sorted by income, voted Democratic.
Piketty just puts numbers behind an observation that anyone covering recent American presidential elections could have made: That huge plurality of voters on both sides of the aisle feel unrepresented and even insulted, and increasingly see both major parties as tools of the very rich.
His belief is that a major reordering of the political landscape is coming. It will be based less on traditional notions of right and left, and more along the lines of what he describes as "globalists (high-education, high-income) vs. nativists (low- education, low-income)."
We've known for a while that America's current party structure doesn't make demographic sense.
Nearly seven years ago, I was sent to cover two different stories within the space of a few days that illustrated this. The first was a recap of the Occupy Wall Street protests at Zucotti Park. The second was a trip down to Jacksonville, Florida for a tour of "rocket docket" foreclosure courts that had been set up to expedite the process of tossing poor people out of their homes.