Despite Chinese efforts to reclaim the crisis as a global propaganda victory—aided by the botched handling of the outbreak in the United States—the domestic blow dealt may be a mortal one, not to the party-state regime but to Xi himself, who has staked his credibility on the handling of the crisis. Unfortunately, the pandemic may also end up being the final coup de grâce of the relatively stable relationship China once enjoyed with the United States.
The Obama administration had already started reappraising the wisdom of trying to unilaterally keep engagement functional when along came
Trump and his posse of China hawks (such as Peter Navarro, Steve Bannon, and Michael Pillsbury) who had long warned that an increasingly aggressive, autocratic, and well-armed China was both inevitable and a threat to U.S. national interests.
Then,
just as a debate over decoupling from China’s supply chains got rolling, the coronavirus reared its head. As airlines canceled flights, trade shows were postponed, tourism screeched to a halt, investment flows dried up, exports and imports plummeted, and high-tech exchanges were truncated, the debate was ripped out of the hands of policy wonks and thrust into the hands of the gods. By decoupling the United States and China almost overnight,
the pandemic has mooted the debate and provided Trump and his hawks with exactly the kind of cosmic sanction they needed to put a final stake through the heart of engagement—and perhaps even the whole notion of globalization as a positive force.
Yet most Americans continue to want globalization of some form—but perhaps with China playing far less of a dominant role. Now that U.S. businesses have turned skeptical of the old style of engagement, that policy has lost its last boosters. Even before the coronavirus crisis,
companies made more aware of the risk of having all their eggs in one basket by the trade war were diversifying manufacturing away from China and toward other developing economies like Vietnam. The pandemic may only accelerate that process.
The U.S. military, churches, media, think tanks, civil society, and even academia have since seen a sudden dearth of engagement advocates as old contacts and possibilities have been cut off.
The U.S.-China relationship has found itself left floating in a gravity-free environment in which both Xi and Trump, because of their mishandling of the viral challenge, are struggling to find their feet.
To be sure,
if the virus is temporarily contained in China, as recent statistics on new cases seem to suggest, Xi may claim victory at home. And if U.S. efforts to control the outbreak under Trump’s leadership continue to flounder, it will only add to Xi’s luster. But Xi has still suffered major reputational damage, especially facing criticism for suppressing the alarms raised by medical professionals in China that could have prevented the virus from spreading. Nor does it help him that U.S. leaders from Trump to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are determined to name it the “Chinese virus” to put responsibility where they say it belongs—and to distract from their own failures.
Win or lose, however,
the pandemic has given Xi an excuse to both road-test and extend myriad new mechanisms of party and state control. New color-coded apps that designate who can move where, temperature-checking police scanners, new kinds of mass mobilization tactics, and digital censorship tools will allow the state to intrude even further into Chinese life in the future.
If the battle against the virus spins out of control again as he rushes workers back to assembly lines to rescue China’s economy, Xi will most certainly claim that the threats to the country’s survival and nationhood have now escalated to such a high threat level that an even more centralized, powerful, intolerant, and controlling government is the only way forward. Whatever happens to China’s epidemic,
Beijing is likely to emerge from its viral trauma more autocratic, more pugnacious, and more inclined toward conflict with the liberal democratic rules-based order that many Americans still wistfully imagine their country commands.