Russian invasion of Ukraine

[Dontrike]

The dolphins that Russia was training might of escaped.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=707c5a4917ae

"So long and thanks for all the fish" intensifies.

[Easo]

So to sum up the last 3-4 weeks:

1. Counteroffensive "did not achieve as much as was hoped" - read, it is over (though it de facto was couple months ago), Ukraine is "building fortifications".
2. Western weapons/ammo deliveries have faltered, EU has officialy failed with the artillery ammo production (heeyyyy....), no magic GLSDB bombs anytime soon, etc.
3. Western money flow also has faltered.
4. Russia's military production is ever increasing and pumping out large amount of materiel, as per people like Stoltenberg himself.
5. Russia has large stockpiles of missiles and drones for winter strikes, as per Ukraine.
6. Russia is slowly pushing forward in couple of places.
7. Oil price cap "never worked at all".
8. Ukraine has manpower and conscription issues, major overhaul is in the works to get more people to frontline.

But none of this matters, right? 3 days, ha ha ha! Not like I expect any normal answer anyway...

I could also ask about the amount of negativity in Western press during those weeks, like the talks about conflict between Zelensky and Zaluzhniy, and sudden increase in discussion about talks with Russia (funny, they all assume Russia would just accept them). Or the recent spat in Ukraine where a deputy suddenly started shitting on Zalyzhniy.
And no, I do not mean Fox. What, are all of them doomposting or paid Russian agents?

P.S.
Dolphins, lol.

[MCMLXXXII]

They really going to win this winter guys.

[Huehuecoyotl]

So to sum up the last 3-4 weeks:

1. Counteroffensive "did not achieve as much as was hoped" - read, it is over (though it de facto was couple months ago), Ukraine is "building fortifications".
2. Western weapons/ammo deliveries have faltered, EU has officialy failed with the artillery ammo production (heeyyyy....), no magic GLSDB bombs anytime soon, etc.
3. Western money flow also has faltered.
4. Russia's military production is ever increasing and pumping out large amount of materiel, as per people like Stoltenberg himself.
5. Russia has large stockpiles of missiles and drones for winter strikes, as per Ukraine.
6. Russia is slowly pushing forward in couple of places.
7. Oil price cap "never worked at all".
8. Ukraine has manpower and conscription issues, major overhaul is in the works to get more people to frontline.

But none of this matters, right? 3 days, ha ha ha! Not like I expect any normal answer anyway...

I could also ask about the amount of negativity in Western press during those weeks, like the talks about conflict between Zelensky and Zaluzhniy, and sudden increase in discussion about talks with Russia (funny, they all assume Russia would just accept them). Or the recent spat in Ukraine where a deputy suddenly started shitting on Zalyzhniy.
And no, I do not mean Fox. What, are all of them doomposting or paid Russian agents?

P.S.
Dolphins, lol.

And why should we pay attention to the poster that was wrong about virtually everything about this war from day 1? Shall we link you the litany of pathetic "pronouncements" you've made since this 3 day special mission was started?

You are a joke on this thread, I'm afraid. Mr Fog'o'war himself.

[Saradain]

When in doubt, Easo posts the typical russian XAXAXA copium. For a guy who looks down on the good guys-siding posters, he sure feels the need to come shitpost here and vanish right after for a while like a true russian mobik in Ukraine. Perhaps Easo is programmed to post after each major failure of Russia?

[Easo]

The people here were seriously discussing if the meatcube was real. That alone says enough about who exactly believes in an insane propaganda and stereotypes.

Yet still the question stands - where is the discussion about recent events and "discoveries"? Nothing but the usual memeposting and cherrypicking. No, not even recent - last few months already by this point, if not more.
Where are the fucking guns? Where is the fucking ammo? Where's the damn money from the OUR GDP IS SO MUCH BIGGER countries?

Existing deliveries were not enough for the counteroffensive. So far nothing even similar in size has been announced much less delivered and even if it were why would it work second time?
How, exactly, can Ukraine win in the current situation?

You do not have to have answers but if you actually care you should at least ask the questions.

[Saradain]

The people here were seriously discussing if the meatcube was real. That alone says enough about who exactly believes in an insane propaganda and stereotypes.

Yet still the question stands - where is the discussion about recent events and "discoveries"? Nothing but the usual memeposting and cherrypicking. No, not even recent - last few months already by this point, if not more.
Where are the fucking guns? Where is the fucking ammo? Where's the damn money from the OUR GDP IS SO MUCH BIGGER countries?

Existing deliveries were not enough for the counteroffensive. So far nothing even similar in size has been announced much less delivered and even if it were why would it work second time?
How, exactly, can Ukraine win in the current situation?

You do not have to have answers but if you actually care you should at least ask the questions.

And what if Ukraine indeed ends up losing, doing massive crippling concessions? You will come here to laugh about genocided ukrainians, crippled, ravaged, decimated country that might never recover?

Tells more about you than us when you so desperately want to be right in this matter, cheering for a terrorist nazi Russia because "you were right".

[Deus Mortis]

So to sum up the last 3-4 weeks:

1. Counteroffensive "did not achieve as much as was hoped" - read, it is over (though it de facto was couple months ago), Ukraine is "building fortifications".
2. Western weapons/ammo deliveries have faltered, EU has officialy failed with the artillery ammo production (heeyyyy....), no magic GLSDB bombs anytime soon, etc.
3. Western money flow also has faltered.
4. Russia's military production is ever increasing and pumping out large amount of materiel, as per people like Stoltenberg himself.
5. Russia has large stockpiles of missiles and drones for winter strikes, as per Ukraine.
6. Russia is slowly pushing forward in couple of places.
7. Oil price cap "never worked at all".
8. Ukraine has manpower and conscription issues, major overhaul is in the works to get more people to frontline.

But none of this matters, right? 3 days, ha ha ha! Not like I expect any normal answer anyway...

I could also ask about the amount of negativity in Western press during those weeks, like the talks about conflict between Zelensky and Zaluzhniy, and sudden increase in discussion about talks with Russia (funny, they all assume Russia would just accept them). Or the recent spat in Ukraine where a deputy suddenly started shitting on Zalyzhniy.
And no, I do not mean Fox. What, are all of them doomposting or paid Russian agents?

P.S.
Dolphins, lol.

1) Yup mines are a bitch and Russia had too much time to lay defenses down, as is the case attacking fortified areas is amazingly hard. As seeb from the amount of men and machine that Russia is losing trying to take a small town atm.

2)Problem is that a war of this size uses an insane amount of ammo/arty and no one was prepared for it, and to get stuff set up takes a long time. So far the west has sent 2million 155mm shells alone to Ukraine. At the start of 2023 the US was only producing 14k 155 shells a month, with it now around 28k, it is set to reach 60k a month next year and a goal of 80k by the end of 2025. Even these numbers are incredibly low as Russia at the start of the year was firing 60k shells a day, with Ukraine now firing around 7k a day.
https://www.reuters.com/business/aer...er%20artillery.
https://www.defensenews.com/land/202...illery-rounds/
https://www.businessinsider.com/ukra...20in%20Ukraine.

3)It has slowed down, but numerous countries are still sending them stuff monthly.

4)Surprised it did not do it sooner seeing how bad they are doing against their neighbor. Russia for how powerful they said they were should not be in a stalemate with a country that has a population 1/3 theirs.

5)Yup

6)Not hard to do when you don't care about human lives of your country men. The shit coming out of those areas is insane in how much equipment Russia is losing.

8)Both sides need more people. Putin has ordered another 172k troops to be added to the army.
https://abcnews.go.com/International...otal-105314951

Anything but a total victory for Russia is a gigantic embarrassment for them. In my opinion neither side will probably win with the terms they want. There will be movements of land here and there, but the land is quite static and the cost to secure new land by brute force requires an insane cost.

[Gabriel]

The people here were seriously discussing if the meatcube was real. That alone says enough about who exactly believes in an insane propaganda and stereotypes.

Yet still the question stands - where is the discussion about recent events and "discoveries"? Nothing but the usual memeposting and cherrypicking. No, not even recent - last few months already by this point, if not more.
Where are the fucking guns? Where is the fucking ammo? Where's the damn money from the OUR GDP IS SO MUCH BIGGER countries?

Existing deliveries were not enough for the counteroffensive. So far nothing even similar in size has been announced much less delivered and even if it were why would it work second time?
How, exactly, can Ukraine win in the current situation?

You do not have to have answers but if you actually care you should at least ask the questions.

Yes the EU fucked up the response majorly and I will never forgive any of our politicians for how we nickel and dimed the support for Ukraine.

We fucked it up from day 1... in 2014.

[Voidism]

We need to be clear about something.

The West is playing a delicate game with russia where we are trying to undermine its military capabilities without pushing it into a clear defeat. We're letting putin cling to hope of victory even though the war is clearly doomed to fail. This strategic ambiguity allows us to maintain an elusive position where we don't crack down too hard on countries like China that are helping russia with some things and we sometimes make it seem like financial support for Ukraine is up in the air: "look over here!"-approach while slipping Ukraine something through other channels. It's important to realize that most aid to Ukraine is fungible - supporting them with non-lethal aid makes them able to focus more of their economy on lethal stuff, and vice versa. This strategy also works for the people in the West who oppose helping them, making them feel impactful and have political agency. "At leazt we don'ts help themz with lethalz stuffz #PeaceNotWar"

This approach keeps putin under the illusion that he has some control over the situation. It's also why the West delays promised deliveries to Ukraine, creating a sense of uncertainty but also changes the pace of the war. Despite these general delays, we have been very good at supplying air defense systems: it protects civilians but doesn't influence the battlefield that much (I mean, they don't really aim at anything other than civilians...). This may even bait putin into escalating missile attacks, which further drains russia's coffers and offers us a window into the capabilities and flaws of their military tech.

Don't be fooled by Hungary, putin's 'ally' - they haven't actually effectively threatened support for Ukraine; they simply act depending on what suits them best but won't truly challenge things in practice. Órban knows he wouldn't 'survive' true opposition to the West. It's mainly us regular folks who thinks in "omg, Órban is SUCH a putin lover... he totally hates Biden because he is progressive!!!"-terms. Meanwhile, the top folk don't really have true ideological personas behind their actions, nor feelings in that way towards other top folks.

At the heart of this strategy is the goal of weakening russia enough to prevent it from repeating its aggressive actions for a very long time, which Lloyd Austin was very open about at the very start of the conflict. We're not necessarily aiming for Ukraine to reclaim Crimea, Donbas, or get reparations - maximum "win." The key is for Ukraine to simply hold its ground, and that in itself means russia hasn't won. This does not mean that Ukraine can't win, just that we in the West are only committed to their survival.

The United States with its advanced war gaming capabilities, knows very well how much they can provide for this purpose. Their expertise in designing and implementing these complex strategies is evident in the very calibrated support provided to Ukraine - enough to keep them afloat, but not enough for a decisive victory (nor defeat).

Managing the situation so that putin doesn't see it as completely hopeless is crucial; we want to avoid him retreating to regroup or, in the worst-case scenario, resorting to nuclear weapons. It's a delicate walk, but the West is determined to keep russia in check through this and the sanctions. We need to internalize this better and also realize that this is the strategy that helps in the long run for most people - including Ukrainians. Yes, one can argue it's unfair to Ukrainians, but that's all on putin in the end. He is a threat and russia needs to be put back a few decades. Usually, sanctions take quite a bit of time to work well, but the zugzwang putin put himself in is accelerating it. Look at how North Korea bloomed for a while, and was even better than the South, until it couldn't keep up. Look at the difference between them and South Korea today. Sanctions take time to set in and are extremely powerful.

[Gabriel]

We need to be clear about something.

The West is playing a delicate game with russia where we are trying to undermine its military capabilities without pushing it into a clear defeat. We're letting putin cling to hope of victory even though the war is clearly doomed to fail. This strategic ambiguity allows us to maintain an elusive position where we don't crack down too hard on countries like China that are helping russia with some things and we sometimes make it seem like financial support for Ukraine is up in the air: "look over here!"-approach while slipping Ukraine something through other channels. It's important to realize that most aid to Ukraine is fungible - supporting them with non-lethal aid makes them able to focus more of their economy on lethal stuff, and vice versa. This strategy also works for the people in the West who oppose helping them, making them feel impactful and have political agency. "At leazt we don'ts help themz with lethalz stuffz #PeaceNotWar"

And it is morally reprehensible. The unmarked RUSSIAN TROOPS should have been blown to hell by joint EU+USA campaign the moment they set foot in Ukraine in 2014.

This approach keeps putin under the illusion that he has some control over the situation. It's also why the West delays promised deliveries to Ukraine, creating a sense of uncertainty but also changes the pace of the war. Despite these general delays, we have been very good at supplying air defense systems: it protects civilians but doesn't influence the battlefield that much. This may even bait putin into escalating missile attacks, which further drains russia's coffers and offers us a window into the capabilities and flaws of their military tech.

You know what would have protected more civilians? Giving Ukraine better weapons to more effectively kill invaders.

Don't be fooled by Hungary, putin's 'ally' - they haven't actually effectively threatened support for Ukraine; they simply act depending on what suits them best but won't truly challenge things in practice. Órban knows he wouldn't 'survive' true opposition to the West.

At the heart of this strategy is the goal of weakening russia enough to prevent it from repeating its aggressive actions for a very long time, which Lloyd Austin was very open about at the very start of the conflict. We're not necessarily aiming for Ukraine to reclaim Crimea, Donbas, or get reparations - maximum "win." The key is for Ukraine to simply hold its ground, and that in itself means russia hasn't won. This does not mean that Ukraine can't win, just that we in the West are only committed to their survival.

The United States with its advanced war gaming capabilities, knows very well how much they can provide for this purpose. Their expertise in designing and implementing these complex strategies is evident in the very calibrated support provided to Ukraine - enough to keep them afloat, but not enough for a decisive victory (nor defeat).

Managing the situation so that putin doesn't see it as completely hopeless is crucial; we want to avoid him retreating to regroup or, in the worst-case scenario, resorting to nuclear weapons. It's a delicate walk, but the West is determined to keep russia in check through this and the sanctions. We need to internalize this better and also realize that this is the strategy that helps in the long run for most people - including Ukrainians. Yes, one can argue it's unfair to Ukrainians, but that's all on putin in the end. He is a threat and russia needs to be put back a few decades. Usually, sanctions take quite a bit of time to work well, but the zugzwang putin put himself in is accelerating it. Look at how North Korea bloomed for a while, and was even better than the South, until it couldn't keep up. Look at the difference between them and South Korea today. Sanctions take time to set in and are extremely powerful.

At this point, fuck it. Lets find out how many of their nukes actually work.

[Voidism]

And it is morally reprehensible. The unmarked RUSSIAN TROOPS should have been blown to hell by joint EU+USA campaign the moment they set foot in Ukraine in 2014.




You know what would have protected more civilians? Giving Ukraine better weapons to more effectively kill invaders.



At this point, fuck it. Lets find out how many of their nukes actually work.

Well, I agree that we should have done way more historically. It's on us to correct it now, especially since the West is the target of putin's wrath in the end - he intends to challenge article 5 at some future point.

Nuclear escalation management is a real thing and not something our top folks take lightly. Yes, sometimes it might feel a bit too cautious I agree but even if there is a 0.1 % chance - that's about the end of humanity basically. 1 in 1000 chance to end humanity is nothing to play around with. At least, the ones in charge don't think so. Fortunately.

[Gabriel]

Well, I agree that we should have done way more historically. It's on us to correct it now, especially since the West is the target of putin's wrath in the end - he intends to challenge article 5 at some future point.

Nuclear escalation management is a real thing and not something our top folks take lightly. Yes, sometimes it might feel a bit too cautious I agree but even if there is a 0.1 % chance - that's about the end of humanity basically. 1 in 1000 chance to end humanity is nothing to play around with. At least, the ones in charge don't think so. Fortunately.

No, and I'm not going to through that discussion for the nth time.

[Kronik85]

We need to be clear about something.

The West is playing a delicate game with russia where we are trying to undermine its military capabilities without pushing it into a clear defeat. We're letting putin cling to hope of victory even though the war is clearly doomed to fail. This strategic ambiguity allows us to maintain an elusive position where we don't crack down too hard on countries like China that are helping russia with some things and we sometimes make it seem like financial support for Ukraine is up in the air: "look over here!"-approach while slipping Ukraine something through other channels. It's important to realize that most aid to Ukraine is fungible - supporting them with non-lethal aid makes them able to focus more of their economy on lethal stuff, and vice versa. This strategy also works for the people in the West who oppose helping them, making them feel impactful and have political agency. "At leazt we don'ts help themz with lethalz stuffz #PeaceNotWar"

This approach keeps putin under the illusion that he has some control over the situation. It's also why the West delays promised deliveries to Ukraine, creating a sense of uncertainty but also changes the pace of the war. Despite these general delays, we have been very good at supplying air defense systems: it protects civilians but doesn't influence the battlefield that much (I mean, they don't really aim at anything other than civilians...). This may even bait putin into escalating missile attacks, which further drains russia's coffers and offers us a window into the capabilities and flaws of their military tech.

Don't be fooled by Hungary, putin's 'ally' - they haven't actually effectively threatened support for Ukraine; they simply act depending on what suits them best but won't truly challenge things in practice. Órban knows he wouldn't 'survive' true opposition to the West. It's mainly us regular folks who thinks in "omg, Órban is SUCH a putin lover... he totally hates Biden because he is progressive!!!"-terms. Meanwhile, the top folk don't really have true ideological personas behind their actions, nor feelings in that way towards other top folks.

At the heart of this strategy is the goal of weakening russia enough to prevent it from repeating its aggressive actions for a very long time, which Lloyd Austin was very open about at the very start of the conflict. We're not necessarily aiming for Ukraine to reclaim Crimea, Donbas, or get reparations - maximum "win." The key is for Ukraine to simply hold its ground, and that in itself means russia hasn't won. This does not mean that Ukraine can't win, just that we in the West are only committed to their survival.

The United States with its advanced war gaming capabilities, knows very well how much they can provide for this purpose. Their expertise in designing and implementing these complex strategies is evident in the very calibrated support provided to Ukraine - enough to keep them afloat, but not enough for a decisive victory (nor defeat).

Managing the situation so that putin doesn't see it as completely hopeless is crucial; we want to avoid him retreating to regroup or, in the worst-case scenario, resorting to nuclear weapons. It's a delicate walk, but the West is determined to keep russia in check through this and the sanctions. We need to internalize this better and also realize that this is the strategy that helps in the long run for most people - including Ukrainians. Yes, one can argue it's unfair to Ukrainians, but that's all on putin in the end. He is a threat and russia needs to be put back a few decades. Usually, sanctions take quite a bit of time to work well, but the zugzwang putin put himself in is accelerating it. Look at how North Korea bloomed for a while, and was even better than the South, until it couldn't keep up. Look at the difference between them and South Korea today. Sanctions take time to set in and are extremely powerful.

Wow, sounds like massive Kissinger cope here. In the dozens of interviews I've heard with American officials via Podcasts from the DoD, ISW and American Senators Including Victoria Spartz and Mitt Romney, none have ever outlined this as the strategy in Ukraine.

Got a source?

[alach]

Thanks to the government and the media, the regular russian people all believe they are fighting a war against all of Nato, the US, and Europe.
Should really start giving Ukraine some more modern weapons to make it partially believable.

[Voidism]

No, and I'm not going to through that discussion for the nth time.

I understand and respect that. It is what the higher ups DO worry about, maybe not as the main thing but enough to manage. Again, not as the main thing nor is my whole post about that. It was one of the many things I mentioned. Thank you for sharing your perspective.

Wow, sounds like massive Kissinger cope here. In the dozens of interviews I've heard with American officials via Podcasts from the DoD, ISW and American Senators Including Victoria Spartz and Mitt Romney, none have ever outlined this as the strategy in Ukraine.

Got a source?

Your request for sources is reasonable but my analysis is not drawn from a single source or from some official strategic outline (other than what Lloyd Austin explicitly stated at the start), but an interpretation of many tiny bits of information from many sources that builds a larger picture. You are welcome to challenge my analysis, and provide your perspective on this, please. I have not found anything other than what I wrote to fit with all the pieces on the "board" so to speak but again I am interested in your analysis of the war and our response.

The views of American officials and senators during interviews and podcasts are valuable but they often represent a part of the larger picture mainly aimed for the public to consume. It’s not a conspiracy or trying to sound important – it is how it works, simply. Otherwise there would be no need for secrecy and all plans would be readily available. The details of the strategy in a fluid and complex conflict like this are rarely laid out in black and white in public by officials. In fact, in some cases the officials talking to media might not even know the larger picture.

My post were my views (as all my posts are) based on what I can read between the lines of what is known and what facts there are. We can observe that:

1. We are slow with deliveries, even the ones we have promised. Except air defense.

2. No one among the allies have actually threatened help to Ukraine in practice that would make russia defeat them, regardless of rhetoric or actions that might suggest otherwise.

3. Despite what some think, nuclear escalation management is indeed something that officials worry about, albeit not as the main thing nor did I want that to be the sole focus of my post.

4. We want russia to never be able to do anything like this for the foreseeable future.

5. It aligns with historical patterns in international relations. Consider the Cold War:

The United States and its allies employed a strategy aimed at gradually limit the Soviet Union's influence and power. This shows how complex geopolitical strategies often plays out over time through a combination of direct actions and subtle maneuvers. However, the current conflict is a bit like this on speed, necessitating even quicker and dynamic response. Note that we’re only at the end of the beginning of a long conflict, though, and things like sanctions will wither away at russia more and more.

That said, I understand that this style of analysis doesn’t resonate with everyone. It’s definitely not the only way to look at the situation but I feel it provides another perspective that is lacking – instead of only relying on the straightforward narratives we often hear.

[Elder Millennial]

4. Russia's military production is ever increasing and pumping out large amount of materiel, as per people like Stoltenberg himself.

The Russian production numbers are absolute horseshit.

While they really are still putting gear in the field, and they definitely dug deep in the treasury to fund this, and have managed to scrap together domestically built replacements for things like electronics (mostly by using non military grade commercially available and by cannibalizing consumer electronics) the reported numbers are misrepresentations of what is actually happening.

Here's an article claiming that Russian tank production of T90 variants has tripled (most modern tank they can realistically build, it's still just an upgraded T72, with some T80 elements).

https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/0...ction-tripled/

Another one noting that more modern tanks like the T90s are starting to show up more on the front lines.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=3abed132496f

But here's the catch.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidha...h=8c140793923c

Russia on paper is supposed to have a fleet of hundreds of T90A's that could have been used in Ukraine. But hardly any of them showed up. Suggested explanations ranged from "they don't actually exist" to "they are being held to defend Moscow" and everything in between.

But suddenly, all out of the blue "Russian tank production is up" and a more modern T90M starts showing up in Ukraine. The Russians of course, loudly report that Tank production is up.

What is most likely happening in reality, is that the Russians never sent the T90A's to Ukraine because part of the existing fleet was in deep storage and part was just never upgraded and were still running the optics and fire control systems Russia cobbled together or sourced from Belarus in the early 2000's and which had significant technical problems which were discovered on the T90S variants which were exported to India.

So instead of deploying them, they sent T72s, T80s, and much of the old deep storage stuff, and they took the T90A fleet and started retooling and modernizing them into the T90M variant. Also note here, a brand new T90 costs somewhere around 4 to 5 million USD to build. Turning an existing T90A into a T90M probably costs a fraction of that.

Once the Russians burned through their stocks of unused T90A to modernize, tank production will once again take a nose a dive. The Russians aren't building that many new tanks from scratch. They are just slapping a fresh coat of paint and some new bits and bobs onto their previously existing hoarder level stockpiles.

And this is the case with pretty much everything they are making.

[Jastall]

The Russian production numbers are absolute horseshit.

While they really are still putting gear in the field, and they definitely dug deep in the treasury to fund this, and have managed to scrap together domestically built replacements for things like electronics (mostly by using non military grade commercially available and by cannibalizing consumer electronics) the reported numbers are misrepresentations of what is actually happening.

Here's an article claiming that Russian tank production of T90 variants has tripled (most modern tank they can realistically build, it's still just an upgraded T72, with some T80 elements).

https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/0...ction-tripled/

Another one noting that more modern tanks like the T90s are starting to show up more on the front lines.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidax...h=3abed132496f

But here's the catch.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidha...h=8c140793923c

Russia on paper is supposed to have a fleet of hundreds of T90A's that could have been used in Ukraine. But hardly any of them showed up. Suggested explanations ranged from "they don't actually exist" to "they are being held to defend Moscow" and everything in between.

But suddenly, all out of the blue "Russian tank production is up" and a more modern T90M starts showing up in Ukraine. The Russians of course, loudly report that Tank production is up.

What is most likely happening in reality, is that the Russians never sent the T90A's to Ukraine because part of the existing fleet was in deep storage and part was just never upgraded and were still running the optics and fire control systems Russia cobbled together or sourced from Belarus in the early 2000's and which had significant technical problems which were discovered on the T90S variants which were exported to India.

So instead of deploying them, they sent T72s, T80s, and much of the old deep storage stuff, and they took the T90A fleet and started retooling and modernizing them into the T90M variant. Also note here, a brand new T90 costs somewhere around 4 to 5 million USD to build. Turning an existing T90A into a T90M probably costs a fraction of that.

Once the Russians burned through their stocks of unused T90A to modernize, tank production will once again take a nose a dive. The Russians aren't building that many new tanks from scratch. They are just slapping a fresh coat of paint and some new bits and bobs onto their previously existing hoarder level stockpiles.

And this is the case with pretty much everything they are making.

Yeah, after seeing the absolute state of their logistics early in the war I'd be very, very dubious of any claim that says Russia is effectively cranking out modern equipment at an unrivaled pace all of a sudden now. The culture of corruption that handicapped them then is still more than alive and well now, as is the need to maintain the facade that everything is going according to plan.

They probably focus much more on easily producible, defensive assets like artillery, because their goal is now to weather Ukrainian attacks and force a stalemate through sheer attrition. Russia's movements and behavior don't align with the kind of offensive that you actually need tanks for. Those T-90s are glorified gun emplacements if you're on the defense.

But hey, maybe it's all fog of war and we're all idiots. That sounds about as realistic as the other fifty times around.

[Elder Millennial]

They probably focus much more on easily producible, defensive assets like artillery, because their goal is now to weather Ukrainian attacks and force a stalemate through sheer attrition. Russia's movements and behavior don't align with the kind of offensive that you actually need tanks for. Those T-90s are glorified gun emplacements if you're on the defense.

Defense often involves elements of offense. Like maneuver and counter attacks etc. This was one of the HUGE mistakes western powers kept making again and again and again early in the war with the whole "defensive weapons" routine bullshit.

Despite the drones, the artillery, the MANPADS etc, a tank is a tank and having a tank is always better than not having one, even a shitty tank is a tank, which is more tank than no tank.

Tho tactics have changed, we absolutely not going to see another Russian traffic jam. The one thing about tanks and armored vehicles in general this war puts into question, is the viability of the "armored spearhead" concept. It's highly questionable ANYONE (including NATO, US, China etc) could put together an armored assault, even one that's well executed with air cover and all, that could just like smash through enemy lines "Blitzkrieg" or "Desert Storm" style without taking absolutely atrocious loses for very little gain.

Like, I wouldn't even want to imagine what a "drive to Baghdad" would look like today...with an Iraqi style army armed with suicide drones, Manpads and Iranian style drones.

[ringpriest]

This approach keeps putin under the illusion that he has some control over the situation. It's also why the West delays promised deliveries to Ukraine, creating a sense of uncertainty but also changes the pace of the war. Despite these general delays, we have been very good at supplying air defense systems: it protects civilians but doesn't influence the battlefield that much (I mean, they don't really aim at anything other than civilians...). This may even bait putin into escalating missile attacks, which further drains russia's coffers and offers us a window into the capabilities and flaws of their military tech.

I don't disagree with your overall analysis, but you're a little behind here. Russia has finally gotten their domestic equivalent of JDAMs (Joint Directed Attack Munitions - the kits that transform dumb bombs into "smart" glide bombs, which the US developed in the late-90s) both working and in production in significant numbers. They are now able to lob bombs from 60km out - beyond the range of existing Ukrainian air defense and get a 100m or so CEP (meaning most of the bombs hit within 200m of their aim point, where previously they had a CEP of around 1km for such attacks, if not more).

It's not a war-winning wunderweapon, but it's a major shift with the only real possible counter being longer-ranged Ukrainian air defense, which is distinctly non-trivial.