If Russia defaults on its debt, it will play out differently than sovereign defaults of the past — and investors are watching for signs that it could ripple out into a broader market dislocation, as Russia's 1998 ruble debt default did.
“The default risk is real,” George Catrambone, DWS Group's head of Americas trading, tells Axios.
And the market for Russian bonds is in uncharted territory, effectively frozen. There are few buyers, and some clearinghouses won’t execute trades, he says.
A decree signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin over the weekend said that Russia can pay foreign creditors — but only with rubles, which are rapidly depreciating, Bloomberg reports.
Whether Russia defaults on its external bonds will depend both on the country’s willingness to pay principal and interest amounts as they come due (unlikely, considering the West froze a bunch of its money) — and its ability to transfer the payments (an open question, given the sanctions), says Lee Buchheit, a veteran sovereign debt-restructuring lawyer, now at the University of Edinburgh.
A debt default is usually bad for the defaulting nation. They get a huge blemish on their credit score, and are essentially cut off from the global capital markets for a time while they work out a deal with their creditors.
Russia’s already cut off from the markets — by virtue of sanctions imposed by the U.S. and its allies. And the state of open hostility (Putin described the sanctions as a declaration of war) will make a debt restructuring deal near impossible to achieve.
When a government defaults, it negotiates with its bondholders to consensually restructure the debt. The deal that ensues often involves those holders forgiving some of the debt in exchange for promises of balanced budgets and fiscal austerity, among other things.
This can take years, and can be super fraught, but it’s a process the market is familiar with.
Were Russia to default on its external bonds, some holders might elect to sue and attempt to attach — or get a lien on — Russian assets abroad even if the sanctions were then in place, Buchheit says. They would be betting that if and when the assets became unfrozen from the sanctions, their judicial attachments would bite.
Some, like Jay Newman, alum of Elliott Management — and of Argentina’s restructuring — say the bonds are worth zero.