After careful analysis of the video, audio, and printed materials from “Islam Awazi” it can be concluded that almost all of them contain anti-China slogans as well as a call for jihad. Despite the transition of its main fighting force to Syria and its initiation within the global jihad, throughout the entire period of its existence the TIP has maintained a position against China specifically. All of its promotional materials raise the problem of Xinjiang and express concerns about the repression of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang. The Turkestan Islamic Party attempts to appeal to traditionally painful issues for Uyghurs, such as the Chinese birth control policy, expansion of the Han in Xinjiang, and discrimination and persecution of Muslims by Beijing. There is a call for jihad at the end of each message, regardless of format.
The TIP attempts to legitimize its terrorist activities by invoking the name of Allah. “The fight with China is our duty to Allah,” says Abdullah Mansour, one of the Islamic ideologues of the party, who justifies his political objectives with theological rhetoric. According to Mansour’s logic, the armed struggle against China is not a political objective of the TIP; it is the will of Allah. TIP leaders argue for their two main objectives — the separation of Xinjiang from China and the establishment of the Islamic state of “East Turkestan” in its place — using verses of the Quran.
The ideology of the Turkestan Islamic Party has undergone a number of significant changes resulting from rapprochement with al-Qaeda in Waziristan (2001-2010) and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria (2013-2016). In particular, the TIP has expanded the geographic reach of its interests and has strengthened links with radical Islamists from Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Maghreb. Today, the TIP has become a serious contender in global jihad. As a result of the impact of transnational radical Islamic groups on the TIP, the doctrine of jihad has been permanently entrenched as the basis of the organization’s ideological platform. The TIP’s propaganda materials have acquired a pronounced jihadist hue. “Islam Awazi” has obviously adopted the style and form of presentation of other extremist groups in preparing its videos, particularly following the models of ISIS, al-Qaeda, and Jabhat al-Nusra.
The TIP has also successfully started to mimic the tactics of the Taliban while conducting terrorist attacks. Before 2003 the targets of TIP attacks were officials, police, and members of the Chinese security forces. After its integration with al-Qaeda, Uyghur fighters began carrying out attacks in crowded and busy areas. This has led to an increase in “the damaging effect” of attacks and an increasing number of victims. The terrorist attacks in 2013-2014 in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Urumqi, and the attempt to hijack the aircraft Hotan-Urumqi indicate a change in targets and places for the attacks. Today ISIS-inspired radicals in Europe repeat the experience of TIP fighters, who massacred Han Chinese at stations in Kunming and Guangzhou using knives, axes, and machetes in 2014.