(This topic is inspired a bit by the upcoming HOI IV, who market heavily General Macarthur as the equivalent of Zhukov, Montgommery or Rommel, which might be overstating the matter)
Generally speaking, whatever were the ulterior capacities of Macarthur in the Pacific, was he the right man for the utterly thankless job of defending the Philippines in 1941 ?
It have to be said first that the outcome itself of the campaign would have been likely the same whoever had been in command-the Philippines were utterly undefensible on the long run without naval superiority. The IJA failed to do it with close to half a million men, it's very doubtful that anyone could have done it with maybe 40 000 trained men. Also, whatever were Macarthur actual command capacities, he was very skilled at diplomacy (maybe not that much with other allied powers/his own government), which was proven abundantly later in the occupation of Japan.
That said, while of course it's easy to say this with hindsight, the whole defence of the Philippines was fatally flawed, even taking in consideration the nearly suicidal overconfidence toward the Japaneses,
War Plan Orange and it's variations had correctly identified the likely starting moves of the Pacific War, and that Manilla could not be held with the available forces (and/or that sending reinforcments would merely had more casualties/POWs). Hence the whole withdrawal to Bataan/Corregidor. That nothing was done till 1935 (or 1936, where it became clear that Japan was not interested anymore in following the Washington Naval Treaty, which prevented a buildup of forces in the Pacific Islands) to build even minimal fortifications (not really needed) or depot (sorely needed...) is hard to excuse. That very little was done after the establishment of the Phlippines Army is even harder to excuse, not to mention the promotion of the widely irrealist plan of defending all the Philippines.
As said, all of this can be justified with ''you say that with the benefit of hinsight''. True. The thing is, Macarthur made catastrophic decisions well after it was clear that his defence strategy would not work-his modest airforce was wrecked hours after Pearl Harbor (on the ground...). Pearl Harbor itself meant that no naval help and supplies would come in a foreseeable future. Between 8th december and 21th december, Macarthur bet everything (mostly, the lives of it's own men) on a foward defence of Luzon, a plan of course completely incompatible with withdrawing toward Bataan. Supplies were not even moved until the Luzon landings. It's not like it was an impossible task-Mariveles (the main harbour of Bataan) and Corregidor were fifty kilometres away from Manilla by sea. The paltry amount of supplies that was finally moved toward Bataan/Corregidor (from the 24th december to 2nd january) was done with the harbour under nearly constant air attack.
TLDR : The Corregidor/Bataan scheme was correctly identified in the 20s as the best possible strategy. No defence line, supply or infrastructure were built/moved there during all the interwar (granted, it would have been against the Washington Naval Treaty...but then again, it did not prevented the excavation of the Malinta Tunnel). Nothing was done when it became clear in 1936 that there would be a war in the Pacific. Even after the fall of France and renewed Japanese expansion in the region (Indochina), the Americans, at the behest of Macarthur, indulged into fantasies of defending the whole archipel with rather minuscule forces (instead of preparing better for the Bataan/Corregidor plan). Even after the sinking of the US Pacific Fleet and the destruction of the Far East Air Force, Macarthur still made little to none preparation for withdrawing to defensible positions-he sent only supplies nearly two weeks after the war declaration (or lack thereoff).